# RENEWED CHALLENGE IN ETHIOPIA

## HEARING

BEFORE THE

INTERNATIONAL TASK FORCE

OF THE

## SELECT COMMITTEE ON HUNGER
## HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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HEARING HELD IN WASHINGTON, DC, OCTOBER 8, 1987

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**Serial No. 100–18**

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Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Hunger

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

80–148 WASHINGTON : 1988

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402

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# RENEWED CHALLENGE IN ETHIOPIA

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 8, 1987

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
INTERNATIONAL TASK FORCE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON HUNGER,
*Washington, DC.*

The task force met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m., in room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Tony P. Hall [chairman of the task force] presiding.

Members present: Representatives Penny, Emerson, and Gilman.

Also present: Representative Bilbray.

## OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. TONY P. HALL, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF OHIO

Mr. HALL. Good morning, ladies and gentlemen, my distinguished colleagues. This hearing of the Select Committee on Hunger's International Task Force will now come to order.

The purpose of this hearing is quite clear. The select committee is determined that a clear and immediate signal go forth that the U.S. Government have the resolve that the drought which is again destroying the crops of Ethiopia will not again result in massive famine. We have only too recently witnessed the horrible sufferings of the Ethiopian people. We have seen the dislocation of millions and the outright starvation of thousands of children. It was a horrible tragedy; its dimensions unnecessary. Many of us in this room and on this committee have been there, experienced and seen the horror of famine. You can see the pictures that are on the walls, pictures from the 1984–85 Ethiopian famine. These scenes are exactly what we must try to avoid.

Severe drought has now struck Ethiopia again. The crop loss in many parts of northern Ethiopia will approach 100 percent this year and will clearly exceed 50 percent in several provinces. This time, however, there are major differences from the situation in 1984. There is more ample warning time. There is an institutional structure in place to organize and manage a rational and effective relief operation. And there is an A.I.D. presence in Ethiopia. There are many people in position to bring about a more effective relief program who have learned from the experiences of 1984 and 1985.

Drought does not necessarily result in famine and it need not today in Ethiopia. It is our hope that the confusion and the delay which marked the response to the emergency in Ethiopia in 1984 can be avoided. If there are obstacles to effective relief, let's identify them now; let's work to resolve them now, before we pay a high price.

Let me say that I am pleased that we are hearing from PVO representatives this morning. All of us owe much to the PVO's. This committee will do all that it can to see to it that the PVO's have what they need to get the job done now during this new challenge in Ethiopia.

Let me conclude my statement by stating that I and members of this committee are anticipating and certainly encouraging early indications from the executive branch that all of the appropriate measures required to avoid famine in Ethiopia are being taken without delay. We simply cannot allow a repeat of 1984 to take place.

Before introducing our first witness, let me turn to my colleagues who may have opening statements.

Mr. Emerson, do you have a statement?

## OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BILL EMERSON, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI

Mr. EMERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

As a member of the committee delegation that visited Ethiopia in 1984, I am deeply concerned that we must once again deal with another crisis in Ethiopia. While natural disasters have certainly been the major factor in both famines, I am concerned that the needed policy reforms are not being made by the Ethiopian government. I am especially concerned that unless these reforms are made, there could be a permanent food shortage in Ethiopia during the next decade regardless of what rainfall may occur there.

It appears that this famine has been detected in time to avert the mass starvation of the 1984–85 famine. At that time the famine was at an acute stage before donor nations could respond, and this resulted in hundreds of thousands of tragic deaths.

Since then, A.I.D. has been carefully monitoring the rainfall and locust situation, and this time we are prepared. I applaud the recent commitment of 115,000 metric tons of emergency food aid in addition to the previous aid that has been allocated in Ethiopia. We have also provided $380 million to combat locust infestation.

I will be particularly interested in ways the United States and other donors can influence the Ethiopian government to change its agricultural policies. Current policies include fixed prices for food, limiting movement of commodities, and providing disproportionate amounts of scarce items such as fertilizer and pesticides to state farms. State policy also discourages independent farmers from increasing their production.

During the last famine, the Ethiopian government placed serious obstacles in the way of relief efforts. I am interested in knowing if they have improved since then. Is the atrocious resettlement program still causing such terrible human rights abuses? Do port fees for food aid still exist? What can we do to end these abuses?

I will also be interested in the views of our witnesses on a bipartisan effort by Congressmen Bill Gray and Toby Roth to apply pressure to the Ethiopian government to change its policies. Can we impose sanctions against the government while still helping the people? I believe we should take a close look at this proposal as a

means of encouraging the Ethiopian government to reform its policies.

I look forward to hearing from our witnesses here today.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Emerson.

Mr. Bilbray, do you have a statement?

## OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES H. BILBRAY, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF NEVADA

Mr. BILBRAY. Yes. As a member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, I have already heard testimony regarding the Ethiopian problem. I think one of the most important concerns of the Foreign Affairs Committee are the port fees, which we feel are unreasonable. I hope that this committee will address this problem, because I think there is a reluctance on the part of the Foreign Affairs Committee, although we would like to, to do anything unless the inequities are corrected.

We certainly do not want the Ethiopian government to make money off of the distress of their people, and we feel that they are. Hopefully, these port fees and the cooperation of the Ethiopian government will be discussed in comparison to other countries. There is a feeling in this Congress to help anybody that is in this kind of situation, but at the same time we want cooperation from the governments that we are working with.

Thank you.

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Congressman Bilbray.

The committee will now hear testimony from our first witness, Mr. Alexander Love. Mr. Love served as A.I.D.'s deputy assistant administrator for Africa from 1982 until earlier this year. Mr. Love is currently Counselor to the Administrator, the highest ranking career position in A.I.D. In this capacity he is coordinating the Agency's response to emergencies worldwide.

Mr. Love is well known to this committee and we welcome him. He is accompanied by Mr. Robert Gribbin, Deputy Director, East African Affairs, U.S. Department of State, and by Mr. Larry Saiers, Deputy Assistant Administrator for the Africa Bureau at A.I.D.

It is my understanding that neither Mr. Gribbin nor Mr. Saiers will be making a statement, but will be prepared to answer questions.

Mr. Love, if you could please proceed with a brief verbal statement. We will have questions for you and your colleagues; your entire statement will be entered into the record, of course.

## STATEMENT OF ALEXANDER R. LOVE, COUNSELOR, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT, ACCOMPANIED BY E. LAWRENCE SAIERS, DEPUTY ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, BUREAU FOR AFRICA AND ROBERT GRIBBIN, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, EAST AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Mr. LOVE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a pleasure to return to this committee. I have had the privilege of testifying before this committee a number of times in the past on issues relating to Africa, and I found the exchange to be helpful, and I think has furthered the cause of resolving some of the basic issues in Africa.

I have a rather lengthy statement which I will not read today but will go over some comments, but I would appreciate, as you indicated, if you would read into the record the lengthy written statement.

As this committee knows, and I think is evident from our early response already this year, the administration does stand ready and willing to respond to the emergency situation and the human needs in Ethiopia and elsewhere in Africa as they arise. I think there is no question about that.

At the same time, as I think has been indicated by comments by Congressman Emerson, it should be recognized that the policies of the Ethiopian government played a role in creating the current crisis. It aggravated the difficult fanatical and physical conditions we face in Ethiopia today.

The Ethiopian problem is, however, turning public attention again to the problem of ending hunger in Africa. That aspect at least is good because the underlying problem of declining per capita food production in Africa is yet to be resolved. An up-and-down cycle of attention to Africa's difficulties will not be a sufficient basis for a long-term policy to end hunger in Africa and last year, as I think we exchanged views in this committee and elsewhere with the Congress on the long-term hunger initiative, we did feel that attention was turning away from Africa, and I think that the famine which is beginning to threaten again in Ethiopia should help remind us we have some serious, long-term problems to address in that regard.

Now, the administration has not just reacted to the problem in a crisis mode. We have been working to develop a long-term program to deal with hunger in Africa. The experiences of the 1984–85 drought, in particular, of our attention to help both improve the ability to identify and respond to emergencies themselves, a problem that, as you are well aware, we had difficulty in coping with last time. But more importantly, or just as importantly, to rethink and understand better the longer term problem and attack the root causes of Africa's underdevelopment and persistent hunger.

The two major steps that we focused on since the 1984–85 drought, first one has been an effort to focus on developing a famine early warning system. That has involved utilization of satellites and improved technology to monitor early identification and help for the assessment and identification of response requirements with respect to hunger and famine.

It has also involved international efforts to promote cooperation and improve monitoring and analysis. This has been particularly important between the United States and the FAO, which many of you may remember last time and there were substantial differences of opinion with the figures that were coming out of our own field assessments and the FAO assessments, and this led to confusion and to delays in the decision making with respect to the provision of food. And initially I think we have begun to see greater willingness on the part of the Africans themselves to cooperate and to share information related to drought.

Last time, of course, the drought covered 20 to 25 countries and it took a lot of cooperation I think between individual African countries to ensure that the problems were addressed. Substantial

refugees flowed over the borders from Ethiopia to Sudan and Chad to Sudan and Uganda into southern Sudan and elsewhere in Africa, but we have seen signs of greater cooperation between the Africans themselves.

In east Africa we have seen the establishment of EGAD, which is a cooperation effort between Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya and Sudan, and I think even in cases where substantial political differences exist, there has been an open exchange in the willingness to work on problems in that region. Djibouti has been the Chair for that particular group and it is the youngest.

In southern Africa, SADA, which of course has a broader charter, has also focused on famine response in the southern Africa region. In the Sahel region, the silt has historically been working on cooperation between the Sahelian states and the coastal states, so we have three focal points for regional cooperation.

And I would like to emphasize, in the long run any real effective famine early warning system established in Africa has got to be based on good, on-the-ground development of data by the African countries themselves. That is both from the point of view of providing ground troops to the higher technology approaches from the satellites, but just as importantly to ensure that the data that is developed has credibility with the African governments themselves. Otherwise, it is stated that they may not act on it as promptly as they would otherwise.

Our initial FEWS Program, famine early warning system, has concentrated its activities in eight pilot countries and we have placed in those countries six public health advisors. We get monthly status reports from the regions of Burkina, Faso, Chad, Ethiopia, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, and Sudan.

I would like to emphasize that the purpose of putting the public health advisors out there is to add to the general identification of agricultural situations and identification of what is really happening with the health situation with the population itself. In some cases, we have not been aware of just how bad the drought self-help situation was with respect to the Africans. So sometimes it is difficult to gauge the impact of decreases in food production. We have had that, the balancing of health, the assessment of nutritional information has added a note of quality and urgency to the agricultural data that has been coming out.

Now, also we have provided to the committee some background data on the satellite information. There are two charts over here to the left that I think give you an example of the kind of data that comes out in a 10-day period, with the red data over there indicating the areas that are under severe stress, and that information is made available to the FAO and to the host countries in most cases.

Now, aside from the short-term approach, we have been working on the development of a long-term initiative to end hunger. This resulted in Presidential approval earlier this year of a new initiative, Presidential initiative, to end hunger in Africa. It clearly was driven by our concern about the famine in 1984 and 1985, but it was also driven by a recognition of the need to address the longer term issues in development in Africa feeling that we could not continue to simply respond periodically to the decreases in food production with emergency assistance. We must find a way to increase

food production and increase income in Africa so the countries can either produce or buy the necessary food over the long run.

Also, it is based I think on a recognition that we saw at the UNGA special session that Africans themselves are recognizing that they do have long-term problems and there is going to have to be reform of their policies and development of their priorities if they are going to be able to overcome these problems.

Now, we feel basic to this is the fact that the African governments must continue to make necessary policy reforms. It must create a favorable environment for long-term economic growth and it must collaborate with other African nations over the long run. Donors, in turn, must improve coordination amongst themselves. The donors and the Africans together must do a better job of mobilizing the private sector and they must rely more on private sources, and Ethiopia, I think, is an example of where market forces could be used more effectively to stimulate agricultural production.

In addition, we think these changes are going to be necessary if the existing resources are to be used more effectively through better management. At a time of reduced budget, as we and the other donors are facing, we think this is doubly essential. However, any initiative to end hunger has got to be long term in nature.

The adjustment process is difficult and it will take a long time. It must be a long-term collaborative approach and it must be accepted by the Africans themselves if it is going to work.

Let me turn to Ethiopia. Currently the RRC has been quoted as indicating that the current status in Ethiopia is "that the rains are worse but we are much better prepared," and I think that echoes some of the comments by the chairman today. I think that is true. We are fearful that the rains this year may in fact be worse than 1984–85, but we do feel that the establishment on the ground of capability, particularly with respect to the PVO's, is much better than it was last time.

Current estimates of needs by the Ethiopian government, which are generally, I think, supported by the donors, range around 950,000 metric tons. Now, this is over and above the estimated 4 million tons of what is referred to as a structural deficit that exists in Ethiopia.

We are concerned, however, that many of the other donors are fatigued with respect to assisting Ethiopia and in some cases they are fed up with the intransigence on the part of Ethiopia's government with respect to the changing of their agricultural policy. Foreign Minister Bayih made a comment at the U.N. that, "There is nothing wrong with agricultural policy in Ethiopia." We think that is simply not true.

Now, the United States, as you know, has already committed 115,000 tons of emergency food aid. We are prepared to consider an increase in the future as warranted when we get a better indication of what the actual crop situation is and what the response in it will be from the other donors. The U.S. food already in the pipeline we expect will arrive in Ethiopia sometime around December, January, and February.

Now, the last few days Fred Fisher, who was our man in Ethiopia, and some of you may have met him when you were out there,

returned from a short visit to Ethiopia to give us an update on the situation. His conclusion is that the emergency situation for the time being looks like it may be under control through late February or March of next year. In other words, there is enough carryover stock, enough food pledged and in the pipeline so we will probably be able to meet the food needs. After that time, we anticipate that we will be facing a need for substantial additional commitments.

As I indicated earlier, we are concerned that the Europeans may be reluctant to commit as much as before because of their concern about lack of change in Ethiopia, because of agricultural policies. As you remember last time we had a target of one-third of the supply of food for Ethiopia because we have in general moved faster than the other donors. We actually ended up supplying closer to 40 percent in some cases in Ethiopia.

Now let me turn for a minute to the long-term scenario, because in many ways it is even more frightening than the specter of the short-term food shortage coming next year and goes back to the comments made by Congressman Emerson.

As we look out in the long run, we are extremely pessimistic about what is going to evolve in Ethiopia. The country is following agricultural policies that we think are not the most advisable. It has an environmental degradation in the highlands of Ethiopia that is washing substantial amounts of the top soil off each year, policies of the government including their landownership policies contributing to a continuation of that erosion, and a decrease in the fertility of the soil.

We feel that if the Ethiopian government does not do something to change these policies, that the long-term prognosis for Ethiopia is going to be very bleak indeed, and we may see deficits running as high—by deficits, I mean structural deficits before the occurrence of periodic droughts that might run as high as 2 million tons a year as we get into the mid-1990's.

If the Ethiopian government were to begin to reverse their policies today, it would still take many, many years before they will turn the engine of economic growth around and really begin to get to the point where they could begin to approach self-sufficiency and food production.

We think the land resources are there. We think the people are certainly educated and capable of doing it, and we think the technology to a considerable degree exists. Currently it is made available predominantly to the collectivized farms who get access to improved seeds, access to the fertilizer, et cetera, and they do very little to really contribute to the increase in food production.

In summary, I think we need to try to pull together the sort of three aspects of what is going on in Africa and Ethiopia today. We wanted to emphasize again to you that while we do not have drought throughout Africa to the degree we had in 1984 and 1985, that the famine in Ethiopia in particular and some of the alarmist developments that are taking place in Sudan, northeast Uganda and the Keremoja region underlie the importance of sticking with a long-term development program getting at the root causes of hunger in Africa.

In Ethiopia in particular, we can't just look at the weather situation this year and respond to it without again reminding ourselves that Ethiopia's broad policies over the past few years are contributing to the deficit, and more importantly, as we look down the future, we are going to see an even more serious situation in which we are going to be revisiting Ethiopia year after year if something is not done to get at the root causes in that country.

Thank you very much.

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Love, for your statement.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Love appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 34.]

Mr. HALL. Mr. Love, I have a couple of questions to ask you, then Mr. Emerson may have a couple of questions. Mr. Bilbray will have questions, as well.

Periodically we will be asking questions of your colleagues, Mr. Gribben and Mr. Saiers.

Mr. Love, my question is, can we head off famine in Ethiopia? Is A.I.D. doing everything that can be done to address the situation in Ethiopia. Is A.I.D. doing everything that can be done to head off famine?

Mr. LOVE. We are referring now to the famine coming up next year?

Mr. HALL. The potential famine, yes. I am hoping there is no famine.

Mr. LOVE. I think with respect to that, we have moved quite a bit more rapidly this time than last time. The approval of 115,000 tons I think has put us ahead of the curve in respect to our response to the food needs. That is put enough food I think in the pipeline, when matched with existing pledges from the other donors, to give us a safety margin through, as I indicated, February or early March.

We responded fully on the requests of the PVO's although there may be other PVO's who may come in with additional requests in the next few months, so I feel comfortable that we have put enough food in the pipeline to cover us through the next 4- to 5-month period. As we approach that and as we get better information out of the crop, the actual crops in Ethiopia, we are going to have to continue to re-evaluate what is going on.

We also have to take a hard look at what the other donors may be doing. As I indicated, we were expecting the donors to make a substantial contribution. We are still hoping they will, but we are concerned that fatigue is setting in on the other donor—capitalists may, in fact, if not prevent them from committing it, at least slow down the decisionmaking process. And as you know, last time one of the problems was not just the quantity that was pledged, it was the timing of the pledges that was there. So the timing I think we have done as much ourselves.

I think we need to mobilize the next month or so a very active program working with the other donors to start to get them to actually pin down both in terms of time as well as quantity what they might do in terms of contributions.

Now, we still have to, I think, go back and begin to address transportation problems, port problems, the role of the Ethiopian government, and begin to look at some of the problems that we in-

curred and encountered last time. We had problems, as you know, of having food arrive at the ports and not be able to be unloaded because other cargoes were given priority.

We had a back and forth on the port thing. We were, I think, successful in cutting the port fees in Ethiopia in half. They are still somewhat higher than they are in Mombasa. We have at least extracted a commitment out of the government that there will be no increases to what is the commercial rate. That is still an issue that needs to be worked on.

We are concerned about whether there will be sufficient trucks. As you know, one of the problems last time was getting trucks both to the PVO's and ensuring that there was a truck fleet that would be able to work with the distribution, and the U.N helped established a fleet. Many of the trucks are worn out, some of the equipment in the ports are worn out, and there is going to be a need to rehabilitate and replace those. We also don't see any evidence that the Ethiopian government has done much to maintain the quality of the equipment in the ports.

A new analysis on the transportation issue is completed under World Food Program auspices. The report is in. We are in the process of beginning to review that to determine what role, if any, would be appropriate for the United States to do on that.

With respect to the PVO's, on the first 115,000 tons we have committed, we have also agreed this time to cover full inland transportation costs, which was an issue that was of some contention last time, as partially in recognition of the fact that the PVO's do not have the financial resources as we approach this drought that they had at the height of the 1984–85 drought.

We are certainly hopeful to be able to elicit increased response from the public, but at the same time I think it would be unrealistic to expect them to cover all the inland transportation, so our initial package covered food shipment to port, obviously, and the inland transportation for the PVO's. Transportation problems are ones that are going to have to be closely watched.

Now, let me touch just one minute on the question of camps, because I think it is important both to our budget issues and to the question of weighting some of the death that resulted from disease last time around.

Mr. HALL. You made a reference to camps, I believe, but I did not hear properly. What did you say, Mr. Love?

Mr. LOVE. The camps, the question of establishing camps in Ethiopia.

Mr. HALL. The relief camps. Yes.

Mr. LOVE. Last time the people came down out of the mountains and they were collected in camps which caused two types of problems. One was disease problems that were being spread within the camps themselves that some people feel contributed as much as attrition did to the death rate.

In addition, by that time you are faced with handling the feeding problems with CSM and special foods that are used for nutrition supplements. This time I think the food is getting in early enough to where we expect the PVO's will be able to get that distributed more in the rural areas so people have access to the food without having to come down to the camps which will both avoid the dis-

ease problem and keep them close to the homelands so they can focus on crops when the rains come back.

Just as importantly, it allows us to meet the food requirements with wheat rather than with specialized, formulated foods, which in this case meant we were able to tap an off-budget section 416 for financing the food and the shipment itself. So I think by moving earlier we both have been able to get around some of our potential budget problems and we also, I think, got a scenario where we have been able to get the type of food in there that will be able to help the people while they are still on their farms.

Mr. HALL. I believe that news is very encouraging. I believe I heard you say that we hope to mobilize the other donors, the international community. I am very concerned that those meetings, those negotiations on mobilizing the other donors, take place without delay.

Are we meeting regularly now? Are we pushing for a meeting to work as one, to work to avert famine? Are we doing that? Are these meetings taking place?

Mr. LOVE. Well, there are a number of locuses for this process. The primary one at this time is primarily in Ethiopia itself. The U.N. still has a group there and the donors are coordinating and cooperating on the ground in terms of exchanging information as to what they are doing and what they are prepared to do.

We feel we have to take that increasingly to the capitals to make sure that the decisionmaking process in the capitals has the same degree of urgency. We have had direct communication particularly with the Canadians and a few of the other individual donors, and we expect that the regular annual food meeting in Rome, which will take place, I think, in a few weeks, to ask for a special, separate session amongst the key donors simply to focus on Ethiopia itself.

Mr. HALL. One more question. What is our current policy regarding our response to the Ethiopian emergency relative to the need there in balance with the political difficulties that exist? That is, shall our response be based on the needs of the situation? Or not?

Mr. LOVE. Well, as the policy generally has been that we will respond to the emergency needs in the country in a reasonable manner. Obviously, we are trying to get a balance between what the Ethiopians do themselves and what the other donors do.

We grappled with the question of conditionality. We are extremely concerned about the fact that they are not reforming their policies, and I think have concluded that they are trying to seriously condition the emergency assistance, might delay that and might result in substantial death, but we have got a dilemma of trying to make sure the food gets in there this time on time but at the same time recognize that their attention has got to be called to the Ethiopians and to the world at large that they are not doing everything they might both in terms of the policy area. And of course we run into individual problems in current deliveries and the transportation of ports—raise those issues also.

Generally, we are going to try to keep food flowing in a manner that will avoid the return of the famine, at the same time recognize that we have to have other means of bringing to the attention of the Ethiopians and the other donors the fact that there are

other problems and that the Ethiopians are responsible for the problems we are facing today.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Emerson, I am sure you have question.

Mr. EMERSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Love, you indicated that we are trying to get the food in there in such a manner that people won't have to come down to the camps in order to get it because when they are in the camps, that is where disease spreads. I have some very vivid recollections of going to some of those camps. We know that thousands of people died on the way to the camps before they could even begin to get help.

How are we getting it to where they are? How do the PVO's get it to where they are? Because one of the things that really stands out in my mind and we flew over, you know, for hours, over thousands of miles of Ethiopian terrain, is they have no infrastructure, no roads. I don't know how you get from one point to another.

How do we do that as a practical matter? How do we get it to where the people are?

Mr. LOVE. Well, basically—of course, you have the PVO's up later this morning and you might want to ask them. Our understanding from the discussions with them is that they are able to move the food supplies much further up country, not right to each individual farm, but at least at staging points to where the people, as long as they are in a reasonable state of nutrition, can come down and acquire a few weeks' dry rations and bring them back to their home. Obviously, that is all premised on them being in an adequate state of health so they can do this.

It is a tremendous problem because the roads are terrible and these people are quite dispersed but the current feeling from the discussions we are having with the PVO's is we can do a pretty good job of penetrating these areas. I am not saying it is going to be 100 percent, but it is a hell of a lot better than what happened last time.

Mr. EMERSON. Very good. Why—this is a matter of curiosity. Why do they charge port fees at all? Here we are trying to help the people. We are not asking any credit for it. You know, if there is an emergency there, why do they even charge port fees?

Mr. LOVE. Well, I don't think it is—I think you have got a couple of problems. One is obviously the Ethiopian government itself is in terrible financial straits partially because of the way they run the economy, partially because they are fighting anywhere from one to three wars at any given time.

The ports themselves are not quality financed; they are not being maintained. They are being pressed, I am sure, by their other financiers to at least recapture their costs of operating the port. Their standard fee that is twice—what we are able to raise last time. Obviously, from the donor point of view we would prefer to see that government try to cover all those costs themselves because it doesn't take foreign exchange from the donors to cover it. So far all we have been successful in doing is cutting it down to the point where we think it is beginning to approach some of the out-of-pocket costs for stevedoring and unloading. It is a good issue, but I don't have a totally satisfactory answer to it.

Mr. EMERSON. You would think that maybe they could employ the military to unload the ships and what have you, but I guess they are too busy fighting their little wars.

You mentioned the unfavorable agricultural policy that Ethiopia has implemented. I think we are familiar with it, and I referred to it in my own opening remarks, but although we do not have a development program with Ethiopia, are there other Western donors that do have development programs that are attempting to reform some of their agricultural policies?

Mr. LOVE. Let me ask Larry to comment on some of this, but the answer to that is yes. We have probably two major focal points. One is the MDB's, the multilateral banks, the World Bank in particular, and to a lesser degree the African Development Bank, who are engaged in a dialog with the Ethiopians on policy. The Europeans both individually and through the European Economic Community also have a dialog going on with respect to policies, and I think it is in the context of that dialog that some of the dissatisfaction has set in.

I think they were much more optimistic a year or so ago that the Ethiopians would make changes and these changes have not really happened up until now, so we do have both bilateral and unilateral donors that are working with the Ethiopians that have bilateral aid that can be conditioned upon such changes. We do not have that unless we try to attach it to our emergency aid which we think would be counter productive.

Let me ask Larry to comment on that.

Mr. SAIERS. Right now both the World Bank and the European Economic Community have been discussing with the Ethiopian government some of the policy changes that need to be made. They have been discussing them in the context of agricultural projects that would be made available to PVO on the condition that the policies were reformed, but these discussions have been going on for a couple of years now. The total value of those projects runs to several hundred million dollars.

It is not tiny activities that are being provided, but up until now there has been very little progress made and the conditions that the bank and the European Community are talking about are not—they are within the context of the way the Ethiopian government is organized. They are not calling for unbridled capitalism running rampant in Ethiopia. They are very modest reforms in terms of a starting point to move into a different direction.

There are hundreds of millions of dollars worth of development and assistance that goes in from primarily the European donors within the course of a year, but those are the two projects that have been particularly linked to a reform of agricultural—the agricultural system, and I think neither of those loans has, or programs has become effective. That is they have not reached agreement that would warrant the start-up of those activities. They are very substantial in dollar terms.

Mr. EMERSON. Does some of that assistance have to do with the infrastructure improvement?

Mr. SAIERS. Most of it has to do with supply of agricultural inputs where the majority of assistance would be going in terms of supplies of fertilizers and so forth. The bank does have infrastruc-

ture projects that are not linked to agriculture reforms. They do have a port project and so forth. There are a lot of other activities that go on with the donors. Those are the two that are linked particularly or tied particularly to the question of agricultural policies.

Mr. EMERSON. Can you tell us what European countries are directly involved here?

Mr. SAIERS. Well, far and away the principal one is Italy, for historical reasons. But I think they are far and away the biggest bilateral donor.

Now, the EEC has played a strong role, the other donors to a lesser extent. The Scandinavians, particularly Sweden, has been a major donor to Ethiopia, and of course the World Bank still provides fairly substantial amounts of aid as well.

Mr. EMERSON. The long-term problem, the 2-million ton deficit by 1990 problem, Mr. Love, is the Ethiopian government aware of this projection and are they taking action to prevent this perpetual famine? Do they show any signs of being aware of it?

Mr. LOVE. Well, I think officially—I haven't looked at the statement but my understanding is it is either a statement to the U.N. or in comments to the press, he was talking about Ethiopia being self-sufficient in food in about 3 years, which I think is patently ludicrous, so if you take the public statements, you would have to say, no, they are not aware of it.

Now, it is hard for me to believe that the Ethiopian government, which includes many very capable people, is not fully aware of what problems that they are facing. Maybe disagreements about how to approach it, but it is not manifesting itself in the public statements out of the Ethiopia government at this time. And you can argue whether it is 2 million or 1½ million or 1 million, but any way you look at it, it is a hell of a problem we are facing.

Mr. EMERSON. It is the nature of their government to not want to own up to problems.

Mr. Chairman, I have a number of additional questions, but in keeping with your rules of informality here, let me defer for the moment.

Mr. LOVE. Mr. Chairman, maybe I could also ask that we made available to the committee a report on Ethiopian agriculture policies that was done in April of this year, entitled "An Appraisal of Ethiopia's Agriculture Prospects," which is done by a mission in Ethiopia and by our regional officer in Nairobi. It is rather lengthy and I think it is a balanced discussion of some of the problems in Ethiopia, and I would like to read that into the record if I could—not read it in, but have it included in the record.

Mr. HALL. Without objection. Thank you.

[The report referred to above retained in committee files.]

Mr. HALL. Congressman Bilbray, any questions?

Mr. BILBRAY. Yes. One of my concerns is the feeling that we are going to be caught up in the cycle with Ethiopia for many years to come.

You stated earlier that many of the European countries are putting hookers, such as agricultural reform, into their potential aid. Yet our aid does not contain these hookers. We do not require any sort of economic-political reforms in exchange for our aid.

I can see a 10-year, or more, cycle where we are going to be delivering and donating food to Ethiopia without any end in sight. What are your long-range plans for dealing with the Ethiopian famine?

One of the criticisms that was made in the Foreign Affairs Committee is the fact that while the Ethiopian government is pleading that the port fees are too expensive, that they can not run their ports because they do not have the money, that the cost of delivering the food stuffs is too expensive, they are spending hundreds of millions of dollars on military hardware. I realize there are several questions to address.

Mr. LOVE. Well, I think the most difficult one is the dilemma that we face of a government that is not doing everything that it might to respond to the needs of its own population, and the question of what happens if we in fact stand back and don't try to help.

Now, last time around—I mean, there were a lot of factors that impacted on the Western governments and the Western private sector mobilizing, but there was an awful lot of back and forth and give and take in this dimension here and elsewhere over what the Ethiopians are doing and not doing. They had a major celebration about the time that the drought was starting, spent a lot of money associated with that. They were not giving priorities in the port.

There were some questions about whether we could totally rely on the government not to bring food if we made it available. All of those things delayed the decisions to finally respond, and I think they were eventually overcome by the fact that if the humanitarian aid was not adequate, we were simply going to see hundreds of thousands and potentially millions of people die, and we still have the dilemma of do we withhold emergency assistance and potentially contribute to a greater death in there or can we find some way through other divisions to continue to pressure the Ethiopian government to begin to revise its policies and show a more responsible stance on its own, and it is a difficult dilemma that I think we face. And what we have tried to do is say to the extent that we are responding basically to humanitarian needs, we will try to keep it focused in areas that we think we can control and monitor, which has traditionally been the PVOs there, try to make them be as responsible as possible in doing that and then begin to grapple with the question of how over the long run we can get that government to act more responsively.

Mr. BILBRAY. What if they don't? What if a year from now the next year they still have problems? Where does the cycle end? Will we still give aid unconditionally, while our allies continue to put conditions on their aid?

Somewhere along the line the Ethiopians, if they continue to receive our aid year after year, are going to have to give a little bit.

Mr. LOVE. First, let me distinguish between the Europeans and conditioning long-term develop aid and conditioning humanitarian aid. I think when the dust settles, the Europeans will not condition their humanitarian aid. Since they do provide long-term assistance, they are beginning to condition the long-term assistance on the reform, so we are not in a position to do that because we do not provide long-term assistance and we don't contemplate doing it.

One of the reasons we try to cover today in this hearing, in the statement, and in the report on the agriculture prospects where we

are going is so that we do not just end up looking at this year's famine as another short-term problem that once we solve it, we can go away and it will be over.

What we are telling ourselves and what we are telling this committee is that we are facing a real dilemma in Ethiopia over the long return that is going to get worse. And that we have got to find some way to begin to address the long-term problem of lack of performance on the part of the Ethiopian government themselves.

Mr. BILBRAY. What I am asking is for a statement on what our long-term strategy is, or don't we have one?

Mr. LOVE. Well, I would say right now we have not gotten to the point of indicating we are prepared to withhold humanitarian assistance. Now we are grappling—you know, as we get back into it this time.

I must say as we came out of the last drought, as the rains came back well throughout Africa, my feeling was maybe we had more breathing time. We worked on the problem, but it has come back so fast now it is re-emphasized to us, we now have to sit down and hammer out a better, more focused, long-term strategy on how we are going to interface with the government.

I think statements like you just made coming out of the Congress telling the Ethiopians, who I am sure are watching this hearing today, that at some stage down the point, the American public is liable to say "enough," is an important message to get across to the Ethiopian government.

Mr. BILBRAY. I think it is a loud and clear message. No one is going to let them starve to death this year, although there are members that would vote to cut off this aid. But the fact is, every year this aid goes on with no inclination on the part of the Ethiopians to correct the situation.

The Ethiopians must get their economic condition in somewhat better shape. They certainly have to work out a treaty with the various elements in the country and stop military spending, and start spending their money on correcting the famine situation within the country.

The Congress will work with them, but we will not continue to send food aid, if they do not begin to correct their problems. This is my opinion, I am not sure how the rest of the committee feels.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Love, it is my understanding that the costs for inland transportation in Ethiopia is something that we need to consider, something that is very expensive. It averages somewhere between $109 and $158 per ton, so if you average those figures, you are talking $135 per ton and if you multiply that times 1 million tons, which we are probably thinking about the total is $135 million.

My concern, No. 1, is $135 million. First off, where is that money coming from? Second, how prepared are we to meet a reasonable portion of that level of cost for inland transportation?

Mr. LOVE. Well, as I indicated earlier on the 115,000 tons that we have provided now, we have agreed to pay for the price of the food and the shipment into port and inland transportation associated with PVO distribution of that. That is financed out of section 416, both the food itself and the inland transportation.

Under the earlier drought, there was a major contribution made to those inland transportation costs by the PVO's themselves, but this time we don't think they have got the financial capability to do it, and so if we are going to work with them, we are going to have to give them some financial help. It is a substantial cost when you add that to the delivery cost to the ports.

Mr. HALL. What are you saying the cost of the transportation of the 115,000 metric tons of food would be?

Mr. LOVE. It is $12 million.

Mr. HALL. Twelve million dollars. Is there any prospect of monetizing any food aid in Ethiopia?

Mr. LOVE. No, not with ours. I am not sure it is going with any of the other donors. It is basically something with selling it in Addis itself.

We have been very, very concerned about ensuring that the food that we put in there is controlled all the way through its end recipient. In the early stages, we had major problems of food that was put into the general food distribution system possibly being diverted to the military. I am not saying that happened, but we are concerned about that. We are concerned about it being diverted for use of supporting the resettlement programs so we have tended to target all our stuff from the PVO's to the end recipient. Not done, as some of the other countries, to monetize food in the capital cities and use the proceeds to finance distribution.

Mr. HALL. So what you are saying is that relative to the amount of food that we are providing Ethiopia, there is enough money available to pay for the inland transportation costs probably until February or March?

Mr. LOVE. Yes. The food we have committed ourselves to now is funded though the inland transportation to the end of the PVO distribution.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Gribbin, let me ask you a question. There has been some concern in the past that in 1984, 1985, there was never an acknowledgment of the U.S. Government's role in relief assistance on the part of the Ethiopian government. It is my understanding there has been some acknowledgment, some Ethiopian media attention on this role currently. Is that true? Can you elaborate on it?

Mr. GRIBBIN. Mr. Chairman, you are correct. During the earlier drought, public mention of the American contribution to famine victims in Ethiopia was not front-page news in Ethiopia. In fact, it was rarely mentioned by the media there at all. If it was, it was five or six-line item buried a way in the newspaper. During that whole drought process, as Mr. Love mentioned, coordination with the international donor community and indeed, relations with the Ethiopians Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, improved somewhat as we were able to grapple with some of the problems that impeded the efficient flow of food to the recipients.

Clearly the Government of Ethiopia has recognized some of the difficulties in public relations and other parts of that problem in the last drought. Because when we announced initial contribution of the 10,000 metric tons in August, it did receive a mention in the newspaper. But further, when our charge in Addis Ababa met with the relief commissioner on September 29th, I believe, to inform

him of the U.S. Government's decision to provide the 115,000 tons of food throughout private voluntary organizations, there was front-page newspaper with banner headlines, photographs, it was also carried on Ethiopian radio and television.

This is an important step forward in our relationship with Ethiopia and in being able to deal with them much more up-front on the sorts of relief issues that are important to us.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Emerson. I will yield to you for questioning.

Mr. EMERSON. Yesterday we had a hearing in the full committee on the problems in Angola and Mozambique. Chairman Leland got on an interesting line of questions. If we have got the grain and the Russians have the trucks, transportation being a problem in Angola as it is in Ethiopia, why don't the Russians, who have a very heavy presence in Ethiopia, do something to help the Ethiopians get this to their people.

This goes back to the why do they charge port fees question. Here we are trying to feed their people, they charge us a fee to unload the food. Then we are still worrying about how to get it to the people when there is a very significant Russian presence in Ethiopia. They do have the wherewithal, the transportation, the trucks, to deliver the goods. Did we ever talk to the Russians about their participation in this humanitarian effort?

Mr. LOVE. Let me cover a couple of aspects of that. The Russians, last time they provided very little in the way of food, as you know. When they did come in and help in the transportation, basically, what they did was help move the people to the resettlement camps which, as you know, was a terrible disaster. I think as we begin to look at the transport problem on the studies that are coming out, which I think clearly are going to show more shortage of trucks, the question might be to what degree are trucks available in the country, many of which are provided by the Russians, can be made available, may be turned over to the U.N. system to be managed as part of the U.N. fleet or otherwise put under the control of people who are working in the relief.

We have been very leery of mixing food that we supply with government transportation and with the Russians in the sense that we are not sure that this food is not going to be diverted.

Mr. EMERSON. Good point.

Mr. LOVE. I think what we may have here is a way of trying to get some of that contribution put into a mechanism which might be a U.N.-sponsored mechanism to where the vehicles which are going to be needed to be used.

Mr. EMERSON. You might like to have Swedish truck drivers.

Mr. LOVE. Right. That would be a possibility. The other question, of course, is—gets to the question of providing food. The Russians provided very little last time. Certainly it would be helpful if the Russians took a look at acquiring and supplying food as part of the on-going requirements.

Mr. EMERSON. Have they shown any indication they may be likely to do that?

Mr. LOVE. Not so far. Now, the third area that I think the Soviet Union could be helpful on would be to talk to the Ethiopians about their policies. That may sound somewhat ludicrous, but I have a feeling that the Ethiopians are being even more rigid on some of

their policies than I think the Russians in today's world might see desirable.

I would hope that some of the counsel that would come for the other side would tell them that collectivization in the villagization process in which they have been moving these people forcibly into villages, is not necessarily the best way to get at the issue of increasing food production in that country.

So there are three areas where, I think, the Soviet Union might help. If we do something with them on the transport question, I would want to see that their contribution is put in the hands of some mechanism that we could trust to handle the food distribution in the open and with some confidence that it would not be diverted.

Mr. EMERSON. I agree with that because we certainly want to avoid the diversion problem by which some accusations were made the last time. Did you care to comment?

Mr. SAIERS. I was just going to say, Congressman, it has always been our position in all countries, as with Mozambique and Angola, that it is the U.N. system that really should act as the coordinator and they ought to be trying to generate assistance from the Soviets as with any of the other international actors on the scene.

We see that as the proper way in which to bring the Soviets into the process. We all work throughout the U.N. as the coordinator.

Mr. EMERSON. If other African countries are adopting policy reforms in order to eliminate the causes of hunger and Ethiopia refuses to make these changes, in a broad context what do you think we ought to do? Is our emergency assistance being wasted without policy reform?

Mr. LOVE. Well, I think this goes back to, I think, the same question Congressman Bilbray had. I won't say it is being wasted in the narrow sense of responding to the short-term famine. It is not, obviously, helping us to get at the root problem. In the other parts of Africa we have worked over the last 3 or 4 years on a mechanism in which we will, in fact, shift the long-term development assistance between countries responding to the ones that are, in fact, undertaking policy reform.

Mr. EMERSON. Would you give us an example of that, a case in point?

Mr. LOVE. A case in point was initially Zambia. Mali which was another case of a country that performed—Mali was a case. Senegal was a case. Zambia unfortunately, recently got off the wagon. They pulled back on their reforms after some domestic riots and we cut back on our assistance in response to that.

There is a country where we have generally good working relations with respect to development. Larry may have some more comments on that.

Mr. SAIERS. A very good comparison, I think, is what is happening in Ethiopia today and was happening in some of the neighboring states that have the same—basically the same kind of environmental problems, recurrent drought and so forth. They don't have the highlands Ethiopia has but Somalia has had its own drought problem this years and much of the Sahel is going to have subnormal rainfall in large parts of it.

But in those cases, while there is going to have to be some emergency food put in, perhaps, and in some cases there won't even need to be emergency food, the amounts that have to go in are so much smaller in proportion than are going to be going into Ethiopia. Somalia agricultural production jumped by 30 or 40 percent when they liberalized the marketing and pricing system for agricultural commodities. We have not been able to put in the same amounts of food aid in our Public Law 480 title I program in Somalia that we had historically because they didn't need the food any more.

While they have had a drought and we have had to put some food in, we are not talking about 1 million tons. The same in Sahel. Food prices in Mali are still very depressed because there has been a substantial amount of production that is going on in the last couple of years. Those countries, while they are still going to need some assistance over time, and Ethiopia would need assistance over time, they are doing an awful lot more to take care of their own problem.

The magnitude of these sort of recurrent drought responses is going to be far far less there than it is in Ethiopia. I think Congressman Bilbray's point about the magnitudes over the next 10 years of what is likely to happen in Ethiopia is what is so absolutely scary. That whole belt is a drought prone and they are periodically going to need help. The others are doing a lot more to help themselves in the process. When the rains do come, they have been able to build up stocks in the country.

Mr. EMERSON. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Emerson. Congressman Bilbray, any questions?

Mr. BILBRAY. How is the cooperation from the Ethiopian government there? I know a few years ago there was a problem—they were asking for the aid but really not being straight with us. How would you rate our chances of getting the truth?

Mr. LOVE. As I indicated in my opening statement, Fred Fisher, who ran the operation during the height of the other drought, just got back 2 days ago and he obviously lived through it last time and has good insight into the problems that were there. His assessment is this time the Ethiopians are not trying to hide the fact that they have got the problem coming. They are not trying to hide the fact a famine is currently developing.

Last time, in the early stages, they refused to admit, in fact, they had it. The RRC is very cooperative. I must say we have always had pretty good respect for the Relief and Rehabiliation Commission itself which is the delivery arm. We think many of the problems that we ran into didn't come out of that organization as much as it came out of the rest of the government.

I think we see a greater willingness to admit their problems. There are some evidences of cooperation there, but we still have to estimate this in terms of their contribution in some of the key areas, such as transport, port handling priorities, et cetera. I think the votes are not yet in on those issues.

Mr. BILBRAY. Thank you.

Mr. HALL. We want to thank you Mr. Love and also thank Mr. Gribbin and Mr. Saiers. Thank you very much for coming. We find

that your answers are helpful and informative. We will be in contact with you and the agency on this issue again.

We intend to stick with it, as you do. Thank you, again.

Mr. LOVE. I don't want to burden you down with paper, but in going back throughout scenarios in Ethiopia this time, that report that I put into the record on agriculture policies was one of the documents I found most helpful.

The other one was the final report on the Ethiopia drought famine in 1985, 1986, that was completed by our mission in Ethiopia which is an extremely, I think, good presentation of what happened last time. It covers what PVO's did. It covers the problems we ran into. I think it would be a very helpful inclusion in the record for the American public to see what happened last time as a backdrop to the problems we are going to be facing this time around.

Mr. HALL. Thank you. Without objection we will accept the reports as part of the official record.

[The reports referred to retained in committee files.]

Mr. EMERSON. Mr. Chairman, I wonder if before these witnesses leave the table if we could ask, although this hearing has focused on Ethiopia, we are aware of situations developing elsewhere and I wonder if we could have a staff briefing for starts on the situation in Sudan? If they would provide that?

Mr. LOVE. Yes. We would be very happy to do that. We are concerned about the drought beginning to show up in western Sudan. We think there is enough food, but we would like to sit down and go over southern Sudan, western Sudan, and the potential refugee problem in the northeast.

Mr. EMERSON. We also have some questions we weren't able to ask this morning that we would like to send to you and have some answers.

Mr. LOVE. Be happy to do that.

Mr. HALL. Thank you, very much.

The second panel includes Dr. Norman E. Barth, executive director of the Lutheran World Relief. He is also here representing InterAction, which is a group of 110 private voluntary organizations. Also on the panel is Mr. Rudy Ramp, the senior program officer for Africa at CARE, and Mr. John Swenson, deputy director of external relations, Catholic Relief Services.

The agencies represented on this panel all have significant relief programs in Ethiopia and all will be active in responding to this new emergency. We would ask Dr. Barth to begin with his opening statement.

## STATEMENT OF NORMAN E. BARTH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, LUTHERAN WORLD RELIEF

Mr. BARTH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to state I certainly welcome this opportunity to testify as to the current and future needs in Eritrea and Tigray, two provinces in northern Ethiopia. Lutheran World Relief working through the emergency relief desk in Khartoum—a consortium of European NGO's and LWR—together with the Eritrean Relief Association (ERA) and the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) has been active since 1984 in what has become

known as "cross-border" operations. One phase of that operation moves food provided by NGO's and various governments from Port Sudan, the Sudan through various points along the Sudan/Ethiopian border into Eritrea and Tigray. Another phase has been the local and internal purchase of surplus grains in the region for distribution inside Eritrea and Tigray.

During the 1983–1985 drought LWR was able to assist over 700,000 people in Eritrea and almost 1 million in Tigray, by providing food and supplies for cross-border transport to people who were unreachable from the Ethiopian side, because they lived in areas controlled by insurgent groups. ERA, the Ethiopian Relief Association, and REST, development groups working in Eritrea and Tigray, but distinct from the insurgent movement in those two provinces were partner agencies in the distribution. A basic objective of the cross-border effort was to assist people in their villages so they would not be forced by hunger to leave their homes and become refugees.

This effort, without doubt, stemmed the flow of persons who otherwise would have moved into the Sudan during 1984 and 1985. Even so hundreds of thousands did cross into the Sudan with consequences which burdened that Government and with unhappy results, in too many cases, for the migrants themselves. The rains in May provided hope for the people of the region but these hopes were soon dashed as when most needed in June, July, the rains failed. Although some rain fell in mid-August, they came too late, either for the early or the late crops. The crops that were planted early did not mature and those normally planted later could not be sown.

Information from our observers, LWR observers in the field and from the Embassy in Addis Ababa, clearly revealed, as do those charts, that crops in Eritrea and Tigray are near total failures this year. On the plus side, however, Mr. Chairman, are the fact that there are now an incredible number of four-wheel trucks available to move the food in addition to the increased number of trained and experienced personnel to maintain those trucks in operating condition.

Now, what does this mean for the people in the region? LWR's experience shows that unless food is shipped now in October 1987, we will again see millions of people affected by food shortage. I would put that figure at about 2½ million in Eritrea and from 2.5 to 3 million in Tigray. Even by shipping in October, we are cutting the margin of safety too closely. It requires 4 to 5 months to order, ship, off-load, and then transport the food over some of the most tortuous roads in the world before it reaches those who are at risk.

How much is needed? Aware of the limited transport and personnel available to move food, and using the most conservative figures, we estimate that to take care of Eritrea and Tigray approximately 37,000 tons of cereals, 8½ thousand tons of pulses, 8,000 tons of edible oil, and 11,000 tons of milk powder will be required initially. In brief, Mr. Chairman, we foresee a continuing and once again increasing need for humanitarian assistance, including food and other supplies in Tigray and Eritrea. We are aware that in any conflict situation there are serious obstacles to reaching people in need. We believe, however, that we have succeeded in finding a

way of relieving human suffering and providing assistance in non-political manners to needy people in Tigray and Eritrea.

Our desire, Mr. Chairman, is to be able to feed people where they live, in Eritrea and Tigray, not in the feeding camps of the Sudan, as we did in 1984 and 1985. We would like to avoid that mass migration from eastern Tigray and Eritrea to the Sudan which we witnessed back in 1984. It is much better to keep farmers on their land so they can maintain their strength, their tools, furniture, and homes. It is better to keep the pastoralists with their animals so they do not feel the pressure to sell them. This is a way to escape the horrors of feeding camps and the disruption of the fragile subsistence economies of the area.

Weather patterns appear to have changed dramatically. Dry cycles which once occurred 20 to 25 years now happen every 10. Indeed, these dry periods may take place even with greater frequency. Surely that appears to be the case now in northern Ethiopia. Another problem is pest control, especially locusts and armyworms, which are rampant in these areas as they lie outside international pest control areas.

Of course, another cause of the problems in the area are the civil conflicts raging for 27 years, I think, in the case of Eritrea and over 15 in Tigray. It is hazardous, if not impossible, to farm when fighting occurs and control of an area changes hands frequently. Aerial bombardments from Ethiopia and air forces are almost a daily event. Crops, trees, and farmlands are destroyed and antipersonnel bombs kill farmers, their families, and animals. Eritrea and Tigray, Mr. Chairman, are probably chronic food deficit regions where people live on the razor-thin edge of existence, and where other adverse factors and weather conditions come into play, disaster is the result.

1987, unfortunately, is again such a year. We were lucky in 1986, which was a relatively good year, with good rains and a quiet military situation between the two insurgent groups, the TPLF and the EPLF and the Ethiopian government forces. Hundreds of thousands of Tigraians, for example, returned to their homes from the Sudan. LWR was able to provide seeds and hand tools to many of these returnees who had lost everything during the 1984, 1986, famine. Even so, for example, over 120,000 displaced people were living in camps inside of Eritrea. As the harvest this year has failed, we will see in 1988 a return of famine into the area unless we take steps now to avert that crisis.

Why are we experiencing another disastrous harvest in 1987? There are many reasons. High population growth rates with related pressure on scarce resources, the tilling of marginal soils, especially on erosion-prone hillsides in an effort to grow food to feed the infants being born, the loss of topsoil through erosion and deforestation of the land, and as wood for cooking and heating becomes scarce, animal dung is burned in its place, further reducing the fertility of the soil and robbing it of nutrients. Also at fault are misguided agricultural policies which contribute to declining production as does cash crop which reduces the African farmers ability to feed their own family.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to commend this committee for its farsightedness to see now what will happen in early Jan-

uary 1988 is not always analytically or politically easy. I think the American people will respond if they are aware of the great human need which millions in Africa will once again face in 1988. If the Congress acts now, it can reduce the loss of human life and the amount of relief needed.

There is also one more thing we need to help the American people understand. It is that we must be willing, surely we are able, to provide assistance for long-term development. The race we run is not only the 100-yard dash to save lives alone. We must simultaneously run the 26.3 mile race of the marathon. That is called long-term development. It is a harder race. It is a more demanding race. It is a race requiring commitment, patience, and staying power. But unless we have that, Mr. Chairman, I fear we will see the time between famines getting shorter and shorter.

If we ever expect Ethiopia and the other nations in Africa to combat the environmental, ecological, social enemies they face, we need to help them with long-term assistance. Sound development programs don't last a scant few years, but decades. Such programs must be worked out with our African development counterparts at grassroot levels. The American people have many times demonstrated their willingness to provide generous relief to the famine-stricken millions in Africa, but they must be no less willing to spend tens of billions of dollars over the course of decades for development.

Not to do so, Mr. Chairman, is to delude ourselves into thinking we are solving the problem. In the short term we may be, but we deceive ourselves and the taxpayer if we think the real underlying problems are solved. One thing we can all be sure of is that unless we make a commitment to attack the long-term challenges, we will be faced with famines, which like the apocalyptic horsemen, will come galloping even more quickly. Thank you.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Barth appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 38.]

Mr. HALL. Mr. Ramp, please proceed with your statement.

## STATEMENT OF RUDY RAMP, SENIOR PROGRAM DIRECTOR OFFICER/AFRICA, CARE

Mr. RAMP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also would like to thank you for the invitation to provide this testimony. I have submitted CARE's emergency plan for Hararghe region which is the region that we are focusing on in Ethiopia, the highland region. This is the second most seriously affected region in the country after Eritrea.

To give you some idea of the magnitude of the problem as we have projected; maize making up about 25 percent of total grain production, sorghum 80 percent, we are forecasting that maize production, probably 80 percent will be lost, which in tonnage represents about 70,000 tons. Sorghum, roughly 50 percent is expected to be lost, representing about 111,000 tons for a total deficit of 181,000 tons. We are foreseeing a population in need of emergency food or relief food assistance numbering between 700,000 and 800,000 in the six highland districts.

We are also prepared to state that at this time there have been no movements of people leaving their villages to move into areas searching for food. We do have an on-going food distribution program in these six districts, mainly in support of food for work, and we believe this has partially impacted on this absence of movement. Overall, we conservatively estimate the total food deficit will be about 90,000 metric tons of cereal in the highland parts of the Hararghe region.

We have initially requested from various donors food to carry us through April of next year. We do have food in stock to last us through December. The U.S. Government has responded very generously with 32,370 tons of cereals and oil. We have also received approval for 5,000 tons from Canadian CIDA and British ODA. The World Food Program has allocated 17,000 tons to the highlands of Hararghe. In addition, we have requested, but have not yet been approved, 10,000 tons from the EEC and an additional 5,000 tons from Canadian CIDA.

The U.S. Government once again has moved very very promptly and we are expecting our first shipments of cereals and oil to arrive in Djibouti ports in December. So we should have food available for January distributions. It is then planned each month through February to make deliveries so we don't have port congestions. I would also like to say the U.S. Government has, as Mr. Love has stated, provided us with the funding for inland transportation and operating costs. We make that same request to all the other donors in proportion to the amount of food that is donated.

There is only one last remark I would like to make and that has to do with the question of port fees. Obviously, since we work through the Port of Djibouti, we are expected to pay those port fees and we do pay them out of the inland transportation allocation. But I would also like to bring to your attention that in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 here in the United States there was an inclusion of 0.04 percent harbor maintenance fee which is being assessed for all exports and imports by the U.S. Customs. This also applies to all exports of donated commodities, including food for relief and development efforts by the PVO's overseas. CARE estimates that had this provision been included earlier in fiscal year 1986, CARE's fiscal year, we would have had to pay in excess of $100,000.

Mr. Chairman, the PVO community is seeking a compensation in the form of an amendment to the Tax Reform Act of 1986, and we are requesting your committee to register its support for the compensation to the Ways and Means Committee.

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HALL. Thank you.

[Material submitted by Mr. Ramp appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 40.]

Mr. HALL. Mr. Swenson, could you please give us the Catholic Relief Services' perspective on this situation?

**STATEMENT OF JOHN SWENSON, DEPUTY DIRECTOR, EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES**

Mr. SWENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be brief. May I ask the lengthy statement that we have submitted be put in the record?

Mr. HALL. Yes, absolutely. Without objection.

Mr. SWENSON. I don't think there is any disagreement from any quarter on the seriousness of the situation in Ethiopia. There is a consensus on that. I think, fortunately, there is also a consensus that speedy action needs to be taken. The thing that needs to be done right now, in our view, is to get the pipeline open. We are going to be facing this emergency for at least the next 6 months and possibly more. It takes time to move food. It takes time to order and move spare parts. It takes time to get centers and structures in place for distribution.

We believe that the full effects of the failed harvest will come to be felt in November; therefore, we think that the pipeline has to be opened now. We commend the U.S. Government for its prompt action in the food it has committed to date. We are hoping for proportionally generous and, we hope, prompt action from various European donors.

In the famine 3 years ago, CRS organized a consortium, ecumenical consortium called, the Joint Relief Partnership, which eventually extended into 12 of Ethiopia's 14 provinces and through which about one-half of U.S. food assistance moved. That partnership is still in place and we are prepared to expand the program with current estimates reaching out to as many as 1.2 million in at least 8 provinces of the country which are hard hit. We think that with prompt action, and if we can set up a distribution system which will provide a monthly food ration to families on their farms, that mass migration and the awful spectacle of death and suffering that those camps provided last time, can be avoided and that must be a major goal.

We think that a good beginning has been made. We thank the committee for its leadership in this matter. I would be happy to take any questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. John Swenson appears at the conclusion of the hearing, see p. 46.]

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Swenson.

As you know, in 1983 and 1984, there was a near panic concerning Ethiopia. The world was unprepared for the tremendous disaster that happened. I get the sense through your comments that we are much better prepared this time.

My question has two parts. I am very curious about what the attitude is today in the relief community, what your feeling is about A.I.D., A.I.D.'s posture on the new Ethiopian emergency. And, second, are we in a position to avoid the worse possible scenario, famine? I would like for all of you to address this issue, please.

Mr. SWENSON. As you know, there were more than casual disagreements in the past among various PVO's, including this one and A.I.D. There was a great deal of confusion. There were various political issues involved. We are beyond that. My impression is certainly that the U.S. Government and I hope also with the interna-

tional donor community, that the humanitarian question is settled, that we will respond, that the value of saving life and alleviating suffering is beyond debate. That dispute has ended. Or it never really existed.

I think what happened last time, the immensity of it and its impact on international public opinion as well as the acute affect on public opinion in this country sensitized us all. I think that Ethiopia has almost entered the common currency of our language as an emblem of suffering. So, I think that on the basic humanitarian issues—and I certainly hope I am right on this—that there is a genuine unanimity of intent to act. I hope that that extends also into the international community and that other donor nations will be as quick to respond as the United States has been.

We have found also, as I think Mr. Love indicated, that the Ethiopian government, particularly the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, has been cooperative both in helping to coordinate aid and in doing things like loaning us food stocks when we have needed it. So, I think that the problems that existed in previous years, that did exist and were alleged to exist with the Ethiopian government, have largely been overcome. I think that the infrastructure which is in place from the last time, the increased capability and commitment of the Ethiopian government to deal with the problem, gives us optimism that if we can get the pipeline open and we can move with proper speed, that we have got more than a fair chance of averting the worst.

Mr. RAMP. Mr. Chairman, at CARE we feel very comfortable that in the areas we are assisting in the Hararghe region the situation is under control and will continue to be, with the commitments that have been made.

We are seeking some additional trucking capacity but primarily four-wheel trucks because the question was raised earlier are we able to get the food near enough to the target population and we have had some problems that beneficiaries have had to walk for, in some cases, over a day to come to collect their food. With four-wheel drive vehicles we will be able to penetrate further. They will certainly still have to walk, but we hope we can bring this down.

In terms of the international community's response, we, through our CARE international members, have already, as I indicated earlier, received support from CIDA, and Canadian CIDA, and ODA of the UK and are seeking assistance from the EEC, and additional assistance from CIDA Canada. We are quite confident this additional assistance will come forth. As Mr. Love mentioned, we all will be working closely with the RRC and Mr. Priestly's office, the former OEOA which is now under UNDP, to do another assessment of needs commodities when the harvest is in and we will more accurately know what the requirements are.

I believe that if additional food commodities are required, that the international community will respond with the additional food as they have already, to carry us at least through next April.

Thank you.

Mr. BARTH. Mr. Chairman, as a member of the executive committee of InterAction, and speaking for that body, I would say that the PVO community is quite pleased with the response it has received

from A.I.D. and the U.S. Government once that response came into being.

We all know in early 1984 there was some hesitancy to move ahead in this area. But once that decision was made, I think our members found that the A.I.D. was cooperative in many areas in providing food stuffs, in providing money for the purchase of vehicles and various other fields, hand tools, et cetera.

So from that point of view, I think the relationship is a good one and has been a healthy one. We trust that this will also hold true now as we talk about what the future holds for us in 1988. Many of the members of InterAction, of course, also we are receiving food from the EEC, Australia and various other countries that they use in Ethiopia.

Thank you.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Emerson, any questions?

Mr. EMERSON. I just want to take this opportunity to welcome this particular panel here today. You do have a great deal of expertise, as we witnessed when we went to Ethiopia. It was very impressive. The consortium which you mentioned, Mr. Swenson, was indeed well coordinated, by my observation, and I feel some relief in knowing that you people are on top of this problem and are doing what you are doing because it is important that—you have learned a lot of lessons—it is important to have you in place with the knowledge that you have, having operated there in 1984 and 1985, do you feel confident—anyone can answer this—you can monitor the disbursement of aid to the people in need there in such a way that we can all lay fears that the government is going to be abusing its power and diverting food? Do you feel you have got a good enough structure to eliminate that threat?

Mr. SWENSON. Yes, Mr. Emerson, we do. Essentially the consortium you spoke of is a combination of private agencies. The distribution is often made through parish churches, missions, convents, all of which are private structures and almost all of them church related, although they do include private organizations like Save the Children UK and Norwegian church aid. It is all private.

None of the food that passes throughout JRP passes throughout Ethiopian government. From the port to the distribution center, in most cases of U.S. Government food, CRS is the consignee and accountable to the U.S. Government. The system we operate under registers recipients with the exception of in some areas of Eritrea where the conflict intervenes, where we give food to anybody who asks without question.

But people are registered. There is a standard ration. The standard ration, although it can vary, is about 57 kilograms per family per month. So we know who is getting the food. It isn't going through the Ethiopian government and although there are almost inevitably losses in a large food program, we are confident it is getting to the people who need it directly.

Mr. EMERSON. What does the government of Ethiopia need to do to make your jobs easier and more effective, if you could comment on that?

Mr. RAMP. Mr. Emerson, from the CARE side in Hararghe, we have had complete cooperation from the government of Ethiopia, primarily our counterpart, the RRC, in facilitating the arrange-

ment of rail wagons out of the Port of Djibouti into Diredawa. Facilitating the arrangement of warehousing and necessary permits for our people to move around where that is required, we have had the fullest cooperation.

I would like to comment on your earlier question. The trucks are all CARE's trucks that are moving this food and they are our drivers. We control the food from the port to the final distribution site. The distributors of the food are all CARE employees. So we have complete control. Where the RRC plays another major role in addition to the ones that I have mentioned in assisting to facilitate this process is in the selection of beneficiaries. Here we have secunded to us by Save the Children UK two nutritionists who are supervising over 100 nutrition monitors. They are going into the areas where the people are coming from to collect the food, to assess how well that selection is taking place. The selection is coordinated by the farmers' associations in each of the villages.

In the first emergency operation there were certainly times when we felt that we were not reaching the most needy and we brought this back to the attention of the RRC officials. In every instance our recommendations for changes were accepted. The targeting of our beneficiary population was improved.

Mr. BARTH. I would like to have an opportunity, Mr. Emerson, to reply to both of your questions. As you know, Lutheran World Relief works largely in areas not controlled by the Ethiopian government, in Eritrea and Tigray. Your question with regard to monitoring, I would just like to say that we have monitors in the field. They are on our staff. They follow the grain from the ports to the recipient. I myself have done that on one occasion. So that we believe that this food relief—in fact, we are sure—does not fall into hands other that civilians and those who are, indeed, in great need.

With respect to what the government of Ethiopia can do, I presume one of the largest things for them to do to make life easier for us and our operation would be, of course, to sit down with those insurgent groups, the TPLF and the EPLF, and come to some kind of agreement, particularly that would let food travel more openly and not be subject to air attacks and other problems such as that. Some sources say that almost 50 percent of Ethiopia is a combat zone, is a war zone. When you realize you also have the regions down along the Somalia border, with all kinds of problems, you can see if you could eradicate that problem you would, indeed, be doing a great deal to help move food in times of need.

Thank you.

Mr. EMERSON. Thank you. Just a couple of quick ones. Mr. Swenson, I think it was you who mentioned improvements in the infrastructure. I am curious as to what those improvements have been because what I saw, there wasn't an infrastructure there.

Mr. SWENSON. By infrastructure, what I meant to say is the sort of combination of the capacity of the government, combined with the PVO's, which worked together in the response last time is in place. It had to be built last time.

Mr. EMERSON. The human structure.

Mr. SWENSON. The human structure and the experience, the little parishes out in Tigray which had never distributed food before are now in place.

Mr. EMERSON. What happened to Asmara, don't we ship anything through there any more?

Mr. SWENSON. We do. In fact, most of the food that goes to Tigray and Eritrea goes through there. That is one of the ports where capacity was a problem last time. We are trying to assess that. Basically, for the food that we are receiving in that area the ports and the transportation structure, we believe, can handle everything currently going in.

But what we are worried about is when the quantities increase greatly and we are doing a survey and trying to get our best estimate of what is needed in both the port and transportation fleets.

Mr. EMERSON. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BARTH. If I may just say, Mr. Emerson, just to clarify the record, the food that we moved came through Port Sudan in the Sudan and crossed into Eritrea and Tigray from that point. It did not go through any Ethiopian port. Thank you.

Mr. EMERSON. Thank you.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Penny, have you any questions for the panel?

Mr. PENNY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I want to express my satisfaction that this time around we seem to be ahead of the game in Ethiopia. I compliment the State Department, A.I.D., and the private groups that are working together to respond to this latest crisis.

Dr. Barth, you, in responding to Mr. Emerson's questions, I think touched on two areas that I wanted to get addressed. The first was the degree to which within that northern region we are satisfactorily distributing the food aid. Your testimony seemed to indicate that you were generally satisfied that they are doing an effective job. The second was the capacity to continue to move food assistance into that region through Sudan and whether you think we are going to have a problem this time around in getting an adequate amount moved through Sudan into that northern region in Ethiopia.

Mr. BARTH. Mr. Penny, let me first reply to your second question. I can only infer that you are concerned about the government of Sudan and whether they will hinder that movement.

Mr. PENNY. Part of it is logistically the quantity that you are probably going to have to move and whether we have got the capacity to handle it all.

Mr. BARTH. Right now we have a capacity to—Eritrea Relief Association has the capacity to move around 12,000 metric tons a month. REST has probably equal capacity but you must remember they have a longer distance to go in order to move into Tigray. Without question, we could use more transport. No question about that. But I think that we can move prior to the rains, if they come, God willing, in June we can move food in to take care of those who are at risk.

The second question as to monitoring, as I said to Mr. Emerson, we do feel that we can monitor the distribution of food. We have done it right down to the village level. We have reports. We have documentation showing that people are receiving the food and it is not going astray.

Mr. PENNY. Can we back up to the other point about the cooperation from the Sudan government and where things stand in that regard?

Mr. BARTH. Well, I was just in Sudan probably 2 months ago at the most. The government of Sudan is having some difficulties, as you know, but I think, Mr. Penny, that the movement of food to the people at risk in Tigre and Eritrea will not be disrupted. I think our grass-root partners in that area have good relations with the government of Sudan, and I don't foresee any difficulty.

Mr. PENNY. OK. Thank you for that testimony.

Pardon me for not knowing, but are all of your groups involved in some of these ongoing efforts to help individual small farmers become more productive? Can you elaborate a little bit on the success or lack of success you have had since the last famine there and what, if anything, we could do to assist your efforts once this crisis passes?

Mr. SWENSON. Well, I think all of us—certainly we used large amounts of private funds in this effort. Clearly, given the character of political relations between the U.S. Government and the government of Ethiopia development assistance would not be forthcoming and in our case, over the past 2 years we have devoted about $30 million to such activities. They included various stages, recovery stages which is the provision of seeds and tools which farmers didn't have because of the drought to allow them to get a crop in.

We have made a substantial investment in well drilling equipment, to improve access to water for primarily rural populations both for human and animal use. Health care—the training of paramedic and other persons, again primarily for rural areas, trying to improve the character of rural life. For ourselves the resources or the political capacity to effect in a major way the agriculture in Ethiopia absent a different policy climate would be difficult. I think this is the only honest answer. But through the churches and the social action arms of the church, we are trying to provide the farmers with fertilizers, breeder stocks, seeds, particularly drought-resistant sorghum seeds, ground amaranth crops that are more suitable to what appears to be a changing climate and able to resist drought.

Mr. RAMP. Mr. Penny, the President's End Hunger Initiative has as its objective to achieve a sustainable increase in growth of food production through conservation of natural resources.

As we see it, in Ethiopia or any place in the world, for an increase in agriculture production there must be an incentive to the farmers. That we have heard amply this morning is a problem in Ethiopia, but we don't believe that should stop us from working with the Ethiopian farmers. Instead, we take the approach that we are prepared to assist the Ethiopian farmer to at least sustain his level of subsistence through conservation.

I am sure you have heard of the serious soil erosion problems in Ethiopia and when you lose soil, you also lose water retention, so conservation of these two resources is our main focus. Do we feel we are having any success? We have only been in Ethiopia in development work since 1985 so it is still rather early to say whether we are going to have any long-term impact but we have had some interesting impacts already.

We hire our own extension workers. We insisted that right from the start we needed women extension workers. This is a Moslem area where we are working, and they said it will be impossible for women extension workers to work effectively in the area. Well, it turns out that the women extension workers we have are the best of the lot. They generally perform better than the men extension workers.

The Ethiopians also do top-down planning, and they send directives out in the field for agriculture targets, for example, land-terracing targets. We are responsible in one district for the agriculture extension activities and we have simply told the Ethiopian authorities "we cannot accept your targets."

We are working with the communities, helping them to analyze their problems, doing farming systems diagnoses with the farmers, identifying the strengths and weaknesses in their farming systems, and then reinforcing the strengths. If the farmers wish to do soil conservation, which we certainly encourage, we will support them. The government is watching our approach with great interest. They are not opposing us. We hope that through this approach we might have some influence on policy, maybe some years down the line. Congress should allow A.I.D. to support such grassroots initiatives throught PVO's.

Thank you.

Mr. BARTH. Through the support of Lutheran churches, we have been able to send privately raised money for development work in Ethiopia, and interestingly enough, we do that on both sides of the conflict line. But I will just address my remarks to Eritrea and Tigre. It is a most difficult part to try and do any development work. Largely, in my view, because of the conflict that is still raging in that area that when you start doing any terracing, for example, it is not uncommon for the Ethiopian air force to come over and bomb those terraces, so your development work is stymied, but we have provided tools and seeds and cattle, oxen to do the plowing, and also we are trying to do some reforestation in the area which is sorely needed, but that is on a very small level. We probably have only spent $6 or $7 million in this area.

Thank you.

Mr. PENNY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. HALL. Thank you, Mr. Penny. We are close to concluding, but I was wondering if Mr. Gilman might have either a concluding remark or any questions.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I want to commend you for arranging this hearing and for focusing our attention once again on the problems in Ethiopia, and I want to commend the PVO's for the good work they have been doing in all of our countries out there that are in such dire need.

Can I ask if the PVO's are doing anything to try to pressure the Ethiopian government to try to improve their economic policies and some of their natural resource policies. I recognize you are in a very precarious position and sensitive position, but if we don't do something, all of us, in pressuring that government to try to reform some of its own measures, we will just continually exacerbate the problem.

Can I ask the panel, the entire panel if any of your organization people are doing anything in that direction?

Mr. BARTH. Well, I would just have to respond, Mr. Gilman, that as Lutheran World Relief works largely in Eritrea and Tigre, we have not been able to do that, but we have of course tried to take part in urging both the government of Ethiopia as well as insurgent groups to come to the table and come to some kind of agreement, cease fire, in order to do that, but we obviously haven't been working in Addis Ababa in this respect.

Mr. GILMAN. The other panelists care to comment?

Mr. RAMP. Yes, Mr. Gilman. At the national level, no, we are not attempting to influence policy particularly related to pricing.

We don't think we are big enough to attract much attention, but the fact that we are small relatively speaking to the World Bank and other multilateral or bilateral donors, the governement allows us to do the kind of creative work that we are doing at the village level. Rather than just passing instructions to farmers we are involving farmers in the decisionmaking process, in identifying the problems, and the causes of those problems, and potential solutions. Hopefully as the government officials participate with us, they will hear some of these problems that the farmers identify in terms of incentives, and will pass these problem to higher level decision makers. We are hopeful that by this indirect approach we may have an influence on policy.

Thank you.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Swenson.

Mr. SWENSON. Clearly our capacity to reach the Ethiopian leadership is somewhat limited. However, I think once again the ability to work with individual farmers through private groups is not an insignificant thing. And being able to do that without the imposition of either collective programs or outside planning, I think, is important and it helps to preserve the integrity of those private groups, especially in our case the church groups.

Second, in some years I think we have found some receptivity particularly in the area of reforestation. I don't think it is any secret to the Ethiopian government or to anyone else that has seen the badly eroded condition of the Ethiopian countryside, that reforestation is a measure of considerable importance.

We sponsored a large program in Gonder near Ibnat, which was at one time a camp in 1984 and 1985, and have had the full cooperation and indeed plan to have the Ethiopian forestry department take that over and begin running it.

PVO's are just that, private organizations. We are not major players at the political table and our charters probably wouldn't permit us to do that, but in areas like that, perhaps there is some room for dialog.

Mr. GILMAN. Do you see any progress in economic reform or in reform with regard to preserving natural resources that are significant in Ethiopia? Any reports of those reforms that are under way?

Mr. RAMP. Yes, we certainly see it in this region. World Food Program is doing a lot of work in the area on soil conservation, land terracing, bunding, water conservation. We are using a slightly different approach. We also use food for work, but we emphasize

extension. Therefore, the farmers are not doing the work for the food, but because they recognize the need to conserve the soil.

Mr. GILMAN. Aside from what your own organizations are doing, do you see any progress being made by the government in that direction?

Mr. RAMP. Absolutely. With the support of the World Food Program, they have very, very large programs in soil conservation.

Mr. GILMAN. This is Ethiopian government?

Mr. RAMP. Ethiopian government, yes.

Mr. GILMAN. Let me ask all the panelists, are you impacted by the PVO—the Customs tax being imposed on the PVO's for ocean freight shipment by our own people, by our Customs officers?

Mr. SWENSON. The export tax?

Mr. GILMAN. Yes.

Mr. SWENSON. We are unfortunately, Mr. Chairman, and we think the Congress didn't intend that. In effect, what we are doing is Congress is imposing tax on food that Congress decided should be sent overseas for donations. At this date, we are facing a bill of at least $14,000 and the meter is ticking. We think that that probably wasn't intended and getting into large shipments of food in the order of, say—let's see, in 1985, we distributed about 200,000 tons of food in Ethiopia—it could be a serious problem. If the tax keeps going up, that could have deleterious influence on the programs themselves.

Mr. GILMAN. That tax comes in the form of a harbor maintenance fee. It is a usury tax, Mr. Chairman, and I understand there is some proposal in the Senate by Senator Moynihan. Is there a proposal in the House to recover that?

Mr. SWENSON. My understanding, there is, Mr. Gilman.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would urge that we take a look at that. They are significant fees that are being imposed upon the food shipments that we, our government, is paying for it in sending it over and we had protested Ethiopia imposing those kinds of fees at one time. Have they relieved those fees by the Ethiopia people, the recipients? One time I have been informed that they were imposing that kind of a tax on the shipments that were being received and we made some objection to that. Are you being taxed at all at the present time?

Mr. SWENSON. Other than port fees, not that I am aware of.

Mr. GILMAN. Mr. Chairman, I would hope our committee can voice some protest to the fees now being imposed by Customs.

Mr. HALL. Mr. Ramp made reference to this issue earlier in his testimony. We took note of it, and we are very concerned about it. I doubt that Congress knew that this result would occur. Therefore, we will propose through this committee to do our best to try to take care of this problem.

Mr. GILMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you.

Mr. HALL. I want to thank you very much, all of you. Your testimony was very helpful. It was very informative. I know that I speak for Congress when I say that we all want to thank you. Your organizations and the other PVO's, especially your people that are in the field, working day in, day out, we thank you all. I doubt that you field representatives ever get adequately thanked and I know

they don't do the job to be thanked, but we in Congress want to thank them. It is a very challenging job to be there every day, and it takes a very special kind of person. We are thankful for you and we want you to stay in touch with us on this whole situation on a regular basis.

Thank you.

[Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the select committee adjourned.]

[Material submitted for inclusion in the record follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MICKEY LELAND, A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF TEXAS

Let me first thank our Chair, Representative Tony Hall, for convening this timely hearing. We are conducting this hearing today because we know that the critical element in responding to the current food emergency in Ethiopia is speed. Resolution to respond to the drought immediately and without the delays of 1984 is the critical element in averting famine. And averting famine must dominate our policies and guide our programs in response to the new situation in Ethiopia.

I, like everyone who traveled to Makelle and Korem and the other relief camps of Ethiopia in 1984 and 1985, remain haunted by the memory of the previous famine. The image of tens of thousands of desperate people arriving in the makeshift relief camps, where there was little in the way of food, water or shelter, is today a terribly sharp picture in my mind. The sight of hundreds of Ethiopian children starving to death was left a permanent impression * * * and a clear resolve to do all that I can to prevent a recurrence of that tragedy.

Members of the Select Committee on Hunger were extremely discouraged that the many political dimensions of the overall situation in Ethiopia served to slow and complicate the response of the U.S. Government to the great famine of 1984–85. The situation in Ethiopia remains complicated. But surely the victims of famine need not be held ransom to the resolution of political differences. It is my belief that all of us learned and remember the painful lessons about the cost of delay in responding to the emergency in 1984.

My hope is that from the beginning—now, when we have time to prevent the onset of famine—we will not allow our humanitarian relief program again to become political despite efforts by some to make it so.

Launching an effective relief program in Ethiopia is not an easy task. The terrain is rugged, the infrastructure is underdeveloped. There is civil strife, the government follows policies which at times make it more difficult for the relief agencies. There is also the special need to get food to people in the contested areas in the north.

Effective relief in Ethiopia is complicated, but not impossible, as we have seen demonstrated. International relief programs made the difference in Ethiopia in 1984–85. The real story of that period is not what went wrong, but how many people were reached, how many were saved from certain starvation. The relief programs carried out by the U.S. Government, other donors, the United Nations and the PVO's were incredibly effective in reaching famine victims. Now, unfortunately, we are all being tested again. We must respond and respond adequately. This time, however, we have the opportunity of preventing drought from becoming famine. That must be our goal.

I am aware of the efforts already underway at AID and at the various PVO headquarters to mobilize in response to the new emergency in Ethiopia. I am encouraged by this early commitment to people in need of our best efforts.

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF ALEXANDER R. LOVE, COUNSELOR, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

Mr. Chairman: Thank you for inviting me to testify this morning. I am pleased to be able to talk to you about the problem of drought in Ethiopia and how agricultural and other policies of African governments affect such situations.

Our experiences in sub-Saharan Africa this decade have been most instructive, not only in honing our ability to identify quickly and respond to, even anticipate, emergency and humanitarian needs, but also from the standpoint of re-thinking and re-emphasizing the importance of longer-term programs designed to attack the root causes of Africa's under-development and persisting hunger.

It was the recognition of Africa's increasing inability to feed her people, the concomitant weakened state of most African economies and the observation that crisis-

to-crisis food aid was not and would not solve the problems, that led to the President's Initiative to End Hunger in Africa. The President's Initiative began specifically as a response to the terrible continent-wide famine of 1984–85, and the new appreciation by African nations and donors alike of the daunting problems facing Africa in the years and decades ahead. Further highlighted by the United Nations General Assembly's Special Session on Africa, a new resolve is evident now on the part of Africans and donors to take prompt action to stabilize the situation on the continent and provide a solid basis for future development.

The President's Initiative to End Hunger recognizes that immediate, preemptive action must be taken to address the problems associated with continent-wide hunger. The effort must be made, begun chiefly through policy reform by the continent's many nations and encouraging development of the private sector, to build a lasting economic base within Africa. This effort is needed in order to begin to generate the resources needed to avert or minimize the impact of future famines. The environment created by policy reform will then allow our traditional long-term development efforts, directed primarily at training people and developing institutions, to bear fruit.

The President's End Hunger Initiative represents a national commitment by the Government of the United States to the goal of ending hunger in Africa through market-based economic growth. The program views the solution to famine as the creation of sustainable growth in agricultural production capacity through the conservation of Africa's natural resources. We believe this is the best way to end hunger as a systemic problem. This ambitious goal, unlike continual emergency assistance, attacks the root cause of hunger in Africa.

Achievement of this goal depends first on the commitment of African governments. They must continue to make the tough policy reform decisions and implement the process. It also depends, second, on the collaboration of other donors, who contribute more than ninety percent of the external economic assistance provided to African countries. The United States will be the catalyst, but the President's Initiative is a partnership between all donor nations and the nations of sub-Saharan Africa. The Initiative is a long-term commitment; it will require continued support by succeeding administrations well into the next century.

The approach to African development advocated by the End Hunger Initiative is generally consistent with the consensus of the international donor community; that a mix of policy reform, long-term resources and institutional development is required. While recognizing that African governments will continue to play a dominant role in their countries' economies, it favors the unleashing of individual initiative and market forces to allocate resources and generate increased production. It is in this context that our efforts to build agricultural research systems and to enlist the cooperation of our land grant colleges can be most effective.

The Initiative at this time places emphasis on improving coordination among western donors around common policy reform objectives, and stresses the importance of mobilizing private enterprise. As part of this effort we are associated with other donors in a survey of experience in Africa—to provide us with a clearer basis for action to improve coordination. The Initative is based upon the premise that existing resources can be used more effectively as economic policies are better coordinated and programs are streamlined.

AID-financed activities that support the revised policy environment proposed by the Initiative are already underway in Africa. Zambia, Somalia and Zaire—to name but three—are countries where the effects of major agricultural policy reform programs have been analyzed. The data show that these programs have led to significant increases in food production, and that the dominant causes were donor-assisted policy reform programs. The major beneficiaries of these programs have been small farmers, and in these cases the amount of grain produced by small farmers has increased as a proportion of all grain marketings. Further, policy reforms have promoted private sector development in rural areas, and equity in distribution has begun to improve as the rural areas become more important in country economic systems.

Finally, the market structure and spending reforms have helped the governments of these countries cut budget deficits and improve balance of payments situations.

While the President's Initiative to End Hunger in Africa presents an opportunity to redress the long-term problem of African famine, immediate concerns must also be addressed. The donor community and affected African countries learned many valuable lessons about how to deal with famine crises earlier this decade. Consequently, the worldwide capacity, and particularly the capacity of the U.S., for early identification, quantification, and treatment of African famine emergencies is vastly improved.

Satellite technology systems now permit routine monitoring of rainfall and vegetation growth in drought-prone African countries. I have brought some examples of these monitoring reports for your reference. The collection and analysis of such data vastly improves the capacity of donor and drought-affected countries to plan and implement sound responses through routine program mechanisms. Such systems have been developed by several donors, including the U.S. and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. Procedures for facilitating the communication of data between these have been established to ensure that decisions relating to African drought are coordinated on the basis of the best available predictive information.

Similarly, technological advancements have been made in satellite mapping, the development of ground information systems, and the creation of better survey techniques and data bases for assessing the health of children and other groups most vulnerable to famine. The monitoring of the health status of children and other vulnerable groups may provide one of the earliest indications of the onset of famine in those cases where it is induced by subtle (non-crisis) deterioration of the food environment.

AID's principal activity for the early detection of African famine is called FEWS—Famine Early Warning System. At present, this predictive system uses information provided by six Public Health Advisors located in the field, in collaboration with satellite data acquired from a variety of sources, to prepare monthly status reports on eight famine-prone African countries. The presence of these advisors is a key factor in understanding and assessing information on potential food security problems before a crisis develops. In the future, as this prototypical program develops and matures, it may be expanded to include additional countries.

At the present time, even without our having a FEWS advisor in Addis Ababa, we are well aware that a famine problem is developing in Ethiopia. We have been monitoring the affected areas for some time and have taken anticipatory action to respond to the emergency needs of the people. That we are able to understand and anticipate Ethiopia's needs is due in large part to the continued presence of U.S. PVOs distributing PL 480 food in rural Ethiopia, as well as the more refined satellite early warning capability developed as a result of Africa's drought-induced famines earlier this decade.

As you are aware, in 1984 and 1985 the world donor community was involved in massive emergency feeding programs in Ethiopia. Food and other resources valued at approximately two billion dollars were provided. There were great difficulties in working with the Ethiopian Government and continued intransigence by that Government in creating a workable emergency environment. That Government was unwilling to accept responsibility to help its millions of innocent, suffering citizens. The government, notorious for its ignominious human rights record, regularly placed its priorities elsewhere. The resettlement and villagization programs, pushed at the height of the 1984-85 famine in lieu of Ethiopian government assistance to the famine victims, have contributed to the economic deterioration. Western government and private sources have put billions of dollars of humanitarian aid into Ethiopia and have thereby mitigated at least some of the consequences of poor weather and the Government's ill-advised policies.

This great humanitarian effort was carried out with enormous success and in spite of almost insuperable obstacles placed in its path—by nature and the indifference of the Government of Ethiopia.

Food got to the intended beneficiaries; it got there with relative efficiency, and it effectively served its purpose. Principal credit for achieving effective field distribution belongs to the United Nations and the Private Voluntary Organizations, who did an outstanding job. In the case of the U.S., losses in food shipments amounted to scarcely one percent of total shipments.

Now the scene is about to be revisited. Ethiopia's normal summer rains started well, but did not continue during July. While they subsequently resumed, it is certain that yields will be disappointing. About thirteen million people are located in the areas most affected, and some three to five million people are considered to be at risk. When the results of the harvest become available, later this fall, we will be able to assess this latter figure more accurately. However, we are not waiting for the final figure before starting to provide emergency food and non-food assistance. Our belief is that a starving child knows no politics—and should not and cannot wait for the absolute quantification of the emergency need to receive assistance.

It is estimated at this time that Ethiopia's emergency food requirement for cereals will be the equivalent of an additional 950,000 metric tons beyond domestic production. The need for this food, supplied from outside, will, of course, develop later in the year, when the upcoming harvest begin to run out. In anticipation, with the

usual close cooperation of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, the United States has already approved $37.6 million worth of emergency food aid requests in fiscal year 1988. The 115,000 metric tons of emergency food aid approved to date responds to emergency feeding program requests submitted to AID by the Private Voluntary Organizations working in Ethiopia. The commodities for the program have been drawn largely from stocks made available under Section 416. Delivery of this food will be timed to arrive in Ethiopia for distribution as domestic production reserves are used up. This pledge of assistance is in addition to 32,000 metric tons of U.S. cereals authorized earlier this year. Other western donors have already pledged 185,000 metric tons of cereals (25,000 metric tons from the World Food Program, 60,000 metric tons from the European Community and the remainder from other sources). Still other donors are expediting already approved deliveries and appealing to their capitals for increased assistance.

We know from experience that humanitarian aid does little to encourage the current Ethiopian regime to change or abandon its disastrous and brutal policies. The donor community is therefore insisting that the Ethiopian Government share in the response to the drought. Relief efforts must be given priority in the assignment of personnel and other resources, and collaborative assistance in response to donor efforts must be forthcoming. Ethiopian Government performance in meeting such responsibilities during the 1984 and 1985 emergencies was unsatisfactory. It remains to be seen how they will perform this time.

The problems that make Ethiopia prone to famine are not atypical of other African countries but their impact has been most disastrous there, where drought, governmental policies, environmental degradation and fighting have exacerbated the problem. Ethiopia's agricultural policies provide no production incentive for the peasant farmer—the source of ninety percent of Ethiopia's agriculture production. Policies seem almost guaranteed to be disincentives to production by the peasant farmer, Ethiopia's most prolific producers. The State Farms, however, notorious for their inefficiency and squandering of resources, receive the lion's share of the Agricultural budget. Consequently, total agricultural production had stagnated since 1980. Since the population continues to grow at a rate of 2.9 percent a year, per capita food production had declined sharply. In fact, it is estimated that a structural deficit—an absolute shortage, not due to unfavorable weather—of some 2,000,000 metric tons of cereals may exist by the 1990's if production policies go unchanged.

Similarly, land under cultivation and average yields have not increased, although only about forty percent of the total arable land is estimated to be under cultivation. Research programs have demonstrated that existing production technology—modern seeds, fertilizer, and pesticides—permit increased yields of between forty-five and one hundred percent, as has been shown by PVO-implemented and AID-financed rehabilitation programs undertaken in Ethiopia after the 1984-85 famine. But the Government refuses these inputs to peasant farmers and makes them available only to inefficient, capital consuming, state-owned farms.

Agricultural policies cannot compensate for a lack of rain, but appropriate farm policies can help generate surpluses in good years that will help meet deficits in bad years. The international donor community, including the Soviet Union, has agreed that the Ethiopian Government's agricultural policies must be reformed in order to reduce the structural food deficit.

It is AID's technical judgement, which has been confirmed independently by the World Bank and the European Community, that modernization and increased production have not taken place in Ethiopia because marketing and pricing mechanisms do not encourage peasant production. The inhibitions to agricultural production include unrealistically low, fixed farm gate prices, forced sale to government agencies, limits on the movement and trading of commodities, continual and forced relocation of farmers' fields and the disproportionate provision of funding and scarce agricultural inputs to inefficient state-owned farms.

While no conditions relating agricultural policy reform to the provisions of emergency food assistance will be placed on the Ethiopian Government, all donors need to continue to stress to the Ethiopian Government that reform measures must be addressed if Ethiopia is ever to be food self-reliant. The faces of starving people—the spectres of dying children—are an inevitable consequence of the current Ethiopian Government's programs.

As was the case in the previous emergencies, U.S. food aid provided to Ethiopia in 1987-88 will be administered by Private Voluntary Organizations. These organizations, where they will work, the numbers of people at risk, and the estimated food aid requirements through April 1988 are as follows:

| PVO and location[1] | Food request | Beneficiaries |
|---|---|---|
| CARE—Harerghe | 32,375 MT | 500,000 |
| Food for the Hungry—Gondar, Welo, Shewa | 6,875 MT | 80,000 |
| Save the Children/U.S.—Shewa | 16,102 MT | 190,000 |
| Joint Relief Partnership [2]—Eritrea, Tigray, Gondar, Welo, Shewa, Arsi, Sidamo Harerghe | 58,900 MT | 1,277,030 |
| Total | 114,252 MT | 2,047,030 |

[1] Ethiopian provinces.
[2] A federation of religious PVOs including Catholic Relief Services, Lutheran World Relief, Harerghe Catholic Secretariat, Ethiopian Orthodox Church, and Mekane Yesus (Ethiopian Evangelical Protestant) Church.

The program described above will meet Ethiopia's requirements for external emergency food assistance during the early part of calendar year 1988. Between now and then we will continue to monitor the situation to identify further requirements for immediate emergency assistance.

Elsewhere in Africa policies are changing, and development assistance is more crucial than immediate humanitarian relief. We will continue to move forward with longer-term development efforts. This is entirely in keeping with the President's Initiative to End Hunger in Africa. African governments which truly seek to help their people become food self-reliant can benefit from the policy and technical assistance this Initiative offers. Together with the Congress, this Administration seeks to help those in Africa who have taken on the burdens of change and development.

Achievement of the goals of the Initiative will not be easy, and it will require an extended period of time to carry out. It is, however, a goal most worthy of our support.

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PREPARED STATEMENT OF NORMAN BARTH, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, LUTHERAN WORLD RELIEF

I welcome this opportunity to testify as to the current and future food prospects and needs in Eriteria and Tigray, two provinces in Northern Ethiopia. Lutheran World Relief working through the Emergency Relief Desk in Khartoum (a consortium of European NGO's and LWR) together with the Eritrean Relief Association (ERA) and the Relief Society of Tigray (REST) has been active since 1984 in what has become known as "cross-border" operations. One phase of that operation moves food provided by NGO's and various governments from Port Sudan, the Sudan through various points along the Sudan/Ethiopian border into Etritrea and Tigray. Another phase has been the local and internal purchase of surplus grains in the region for distribution inside Eritrea and Tigray.

During the 1983-85 drought LWR was able to assist over 700,000 people in Etritrea and almost 1 million in Tigray, by providing food and supplies for cross-border transport to people who were unreachable from the Ethiopian side, because they lived in areas controlled by insurgent groups ERA and REST, development groups working in Eritrea and Tigray, but distinct from the insurgent movement in those two provinces were partner agencies in the distribution. A basic objective of the cross-border effort was to assist people in their villages so they would not be forced by hunger to leave their homes and become refugees.

This effort, without doubt, stemmed the flow of persons who otherwise would have moved into the Sudan during 1984 and 1985. Even so hundreds of thousands did cross into the Sudan with consequences which burdened that Government and with unhappy results, in too many cases, for the migrants themselves.

Fortunately, 1986 was a year with relatively good rains and a quiet military situation between the two insurgents groups (TPLF & EPLF) and the Ethiopian Government Forces. Hundreds of thousands of Tigrayans returned to their homes from the Sudan. LWR was able to provide seeds and hand-tools to many of these returnees who had lost everything during the 1984-86 famine. Even so 120,000 displaced people were living in camps inside of Eritrea.

As the harvest this year has failed it is my opinion that 1988 will see a return of famine to the area unless we take steps now to avert another crisis like 1984-85.

Why are we experiencing another disasterous harvest in 1987? There are many reasons: high population, growth rates with related pressure on scarce resources; the tilling of marginal soils especially on erosion prone hillsides in an effort to grow food to feed the infants being born; the loss of top soil through erosion and the deforestation of the land. As wood for cooking and heating becomes scarce, animal

dung burned in its place further reduces the fertility of the soil and robs it of nutrients.

Also at fault are misguided agricultural policies which contribute to declining production as does cash cropping which reduces the African farmers' ability to feed their own family.

Weather patterns appear to have changed dramatically. Dry cycles which once occurred every 20–25 years happen now every 10 years. Indeed these dry periods may take place with ever greater frequency. Surely that appears to be the case now in northern Ethiopia.

Pest control, especially locusts and army worms are rampant in these areas as they lie outside international pest control areas.

Of course another cause of the problems in the area are the civil conflicts raging for 27 years in Etritrea and over 15 years in Tigray. It's hazardous, if not impossible, to farm when fighting occurs and control of an area changes hands frequently. Aerial bombardments from the Ethiopian air force are almost daily events. Crops, trees, and farm land is destroyed and anti-personnel bombs kill farmers, their families and their animals.

Eritrea and Tigray, Mr. Chairman, are probably chronic food deficit regions where people live on a razor-thin margin of existance. And where other adverse factors and weather conditions come into play disaster is the result. 1987, unfortunately is again such a year.

The rains in May provided hope to the people of the region. But these hopes were soon dashed as, when most needed in June and July, the rains failed. Although some rain fell in mid-August, they were too late, either for the early or late crops. The crops that were planted early did not mature, and those normally planted later could not be saved.

Information from LWR observers in the field and the US Embassy in Addis Ababa clearly reveal the crops in Etritrea and Tigray are near total failures this year.

On the plus side are the four-wheel trucks now available to move the food, in addition to the increased number of trained and experienced personnel to maintain these trucks in operating condition.

What does this mean for the millions of people in the region?

LWR's experience shows that unless food is shipped now, in October 1987, we will again see millions of people affected by food shortage. I would put that figure at about 2.5 million in Etritrea and 2.5 to 3 million in Tigray. Even by shipping in October, this month, we are cutting the margin of safety too closely. Four to five months are really required to order, ship, off-load, and then transport the food over some of the most tortuous roads in the world before it reaches those who are at risk.

How much is needed? Aware of the limited transport and personnel available to move the food, and using the most conservative figures, approximately 37,000 MT of cereals; 8,500 MT pulses; 8,000 MT edible oil; and 11,000 MT milk powder will be required in 1988.

In brief, Mr. Chairman, we foresee a continuing and once again increasing need for humanitarian assistance—including food and other emergency supplies in Tigray and Eritrea. We are aware that in any conflict situation there are serious obstacles to reaching people in need. We believe, however, that we have succeeded in finding a way of releaving human suffering and providing assistance in a non-political manner to needy people in Tigray and Eritrea.

Our desire, Mr. Chairman, is to be able to feed people where they live in Eritrea and Tigray—not in feeding camps in the Sudan, as in 1984 and 1985. We would like to avoid that mass migration from eastern Tigray and Eritrea to the Sudan which we witnessed in 1984. It's much better to keep the farmers on their land so that they can maintain their strength, tools, furniture and homes. It's better to keep the pastoralists with their animals so they do not feel the pressure to sell them. This is a way to escape the horrors of feeding camps and the disruption of the fragile subsistence economies of the region.

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I'd like to commend this committee for its far-sightedness. To see now what will happen in early January '88 is not always analytically nor politically easy. I think the American people will respond if they are aware of the great human need which millions in Africa will once again face in 1988. And if the Congress acts now it can reduce the loss of human life and the amount of relief needed.

There is also one more thing we need to help the American people understand. It is that we must be willing (surely we are able) to provide assistance for long-term development. The race we run is not only the 100-yard dash to save lives today. We must simultaneously run the 26.3 miles of the marathon. That's called long-term

development assistance. It's a harder race; it's a more demanding race. It's a race requiring commitment, patience and staying power. But unless we have that, Mr. Chairman, I fear we will see the time between famines get shorter and shorter. If we ever expect Ethiopia and other nations in Africa to be able to combat the environmental, ecological, social enemies they face, we need to help with increased long-term assistance. Sound development programs don't last a scant few years, but decades. Such programs must be worked out with our African development counterparts at grassroot levels.

The American people have many times demonstrated their willingness to provide generous relief to the famine stricken millions in Africa. But they must be no less willing to spend tens of billions of dollars over the course of decades for development. Not to do so, Mr. Chairman, is to delude ourselves into thinking we are solving the problem. In the short-term we may be. But we deceive ourselves and the taxpayer if we think the real underlying problems are solved. One thing we can all be sure of is that unless we make a commitment to attack the long-term challenges, we will be faced with famines, which like the Apocalyptic Horseman will come galloping ever more quickly.

Thank you.

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MATERIAL SUBMITTED BY RUDY RAMP, REGIONAL PROGRAM MANAGER FOR EAST AFRICA, CARE

CARE-ETHIOPIA—HARARGHE EMERGENCY PLAN, DECEMBER 1987–DECEMBER 1988

SUMMARY

Low levels of precipitation since late June have caused nearly total loss of this year's maize crop and substantial losses of sorghum. Clear visual evidence of these losses is apparent in all crop growing areas of Hararghe. As these two crops respectively represent 23% and 60% of grain production for the region severe food shortages are expected beginning in December 1987 until the next major crop in late 1988. CARE is proposing that an additional 45,000 metric tons of grain and 1,710 tons of vegetable oil be immediately programmed for the six highland awrajas [1] in which it distributed grain during 1986 and 1987. These commodities, together with 2,000 tons of food already allocated to the area for 1988 under CARE's regular program and an estimated 17,000 tons of WFP FFW commodities should be considered as the minimum food assistance requirement for the 6 awrajas in 1988. It is essential that arrangements for shipment of these commodities are immediately initiated so that they arrive in time to prevent mass starvation, dislocation, and shelter formation. In view of the current situation it is likely that an additional 20,000 to 40,000 tons of commodities may be required but this cannot be verified until a better harvest estimate is available.

BACKGROUND

CARE established operations in Ethiopia in late 1984 and commenced food distribution in Hararghe region in March 1985 at a level of 250,000 beneficiaries. In mid-1986 the level was increased to 600,000 and an average of 383,000 beneficiaries monthly received food during calendar year 1986. Following an improved harvest in 1986/87 the level of beneficiaries was reduced to 175,000 monthly in January 1987 which is currently still in effect. In mid-1987 FFW activities were initiated in the highland regions and these now comprise approximately two thirds of current distributions. To support the program CARE still maintains staff and offices in Asbetefari and Jijiga and much of the infrastructure from the previous emergency program is still in place. From March 1985 to August 1987 CARE distributed approximately 112,000 tons of food commodities in Hararghe Region and expended $11,621,350 for transport and operational costs.

COMMODITY REQUIREMENTS

Annual grain production in Hararghe during the 1980/81 to 1983/84 base period is estimated at 370,000 tons. This consisted of approximately 60% sorghum, 23% maize and 4% each of teff, wheat, and barley. Based on these figures an 80% loss of the maize crop and 50% loss of sorghum would produce a shortfall of 70,000 tons of

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[1] Habro, Chercher, Dire Dawa, Garamuleta, Gursum, Jijiga with a total population of approximately 2,000,000.

maize and 111,000 tons of sorghum for the region. This 181,000 ton shortfall would occur mainly in the highland awrajas which contain the bulk of the population. The population of the six awrajas where CARE plans to distribute grain is approximately 2,000,000 or roughly 50% of the regional total. This would imply a shortfall of 90,500 tons for these awrajas if crop production and population were evenly distributed. This is not the case and Hararghe has been considered as a food deficit region during the base period with production of 370,000 tons. Thus the 90,500 tons should be considered a highly conservative estimate based on 80% and 50% loss figures for maize and sorghum. It is quite possible that actual losses will be higher if precipitation is insufficient during September.

Of the projected 90,500 ton deficit 17,000 tons is expected to be filled through WFP commodities programmed as FFW by the MOA. CARE-Ethiopia has also planned distribution of 2,000 tons of PL 480 commodities as FFW through its regular programs in 1988. This leaves an unfilled requirement of 71,500 tons. It is proposed that an immediate allocation of 45,000 tons be made to partially cover this so that commodities arrive in time. The remainder can be allocated if deemed necessary when a more accurate harvest estimate is available at the end of 1987.

The preferred commodity in this case would be bulgar wheat due to the following reasons:

Its preparation is easier than whole grain commodities.

It requires less fuel for preparation.

It is more likely to be consumed than sold. Very little of the more than 100,000 tons of previously distributed bulgar has appeared in the market, and it is thus easier to ensure proper usage.

People in the area are familiar with it as more than 100,000 tons have been distributed in the last 2.5 years.

Should bulgar be unavailable other acceptable commodities in order of preference would be wheat, maize, or sorghum.

To complement the 45,000 tons of grain a total of 1,700 tons of vegetable oil will be required. A daily ration of 400 gms of grain and 15 gms of oil will be distributed to relief beneficiaries. In areas where FFW activities are implemented participants will obtain 3 kgs of grain and 125 gms of oil per workday.

### TRANSPORT REQUIREMENTS

In the past nearly all goods for CARE's programs in Hararghe have come through Djibouti port. However, railway capacity from Djibouti is limited and under the best of circumstances has not exceeded 7,500 tons per month for CARE's commodities. For this reason it is provisionally planned that only 30,000 tons of the additional grain will be routed through Djibouti and the remainder through Asseb, despite the potential difficulties and higher cost. An assessment confirming this will be made prior to delivery.

CARE's present truck fleet in Hararghe consists of 3 15 ton semitrailer trucks, 28 10 ton trucks with trailers and and 2 6 ton four wheel drive trucks borrowed from CRDA. All, excepting the borrowed trucks, are nearly 2.5 years old. Consequently, they are not sufficiently reliable for use and operational costs are increasing. For the amount of commodities to be handled during the coming year 2 additional 15 ton semitrailers and 8 additional four wheel drive trucks are required. Experience in 1985 and 1986 indicates that the four wheel drive trucks are essential for reaching remote areas.

Replacement of 5 light vehicles (Toyota Hi-Lux pickups) will be required for monitoring purposes. Purchase of Toyota Landcruiser pickups is planned.

### STORAGE

Storage capacity has been a problem in 1987. Two Rubhall tents should be received soon from the UN but additional capacity may be required. Thus a $200,000 contingency for warehouse construction has been included in the budget.

### PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

As in the past CARE will work closely with the RRC, Farmers' Associations, and the Drought Relief Committees at all levels in implementing the program. This will include close coordination in beneficiary selection.

Nutritional monitoring of under fives through WFL measurements will be continued as in previous programs. Nutritional data will assist in targeting program areas, selecting beneficiaries, and monitoring the program's effectiveness.

In keeping with previous efforts to lessen dependency on relief commodities, implementation will include a FFW component. This will occur mainly in Gursum Awraja where the necessary infrastructure exists due to the presence of the Gursum Land Use Project. In Gursum CARE has 28 extension agents funded by Band Aid working in the field who will participate in implementing and monitoring FFW activities. In other areas FFW activities will be implemented to the extent practicable, depending on the beneficiary population (nomadic vs. settled), volume of commodities to be distributed, and existing infrastructure.

*Budget requirements* [2]

| | *Amount* |
|---|---|
| 1. Operations costs—$65,000/mo × 12 | $780,000 |
| 2. Transport: | |
| A. Transport 35,000 tons × $40 (from Djibouti to D.D.) | 1,400,000 |
| B. Transport 35,000 tons × $35 (D.D.—distribution sites) | 1,025,000 |
| C. Transport 10,000 tons × $75 (Asseb to distribution) | 750,000 |
| D. Truck and vehicle spare parts (current CARE-Ethiopia stocks) | 350,000 |
| 3. Truck purchase: | |
| 15 ton semitrailers—2 × 80,000 | 160,000 |
| 6 ton 4 wheel drive—4 × 4 55,000 | 440,000 |
| 4. Light Vehicles 5 × 15,000 | 75,000 |
| 5. Warehousing Contingency | 200,000 |
| 6. CARE Headquarters Administrative costs (9.34%) | 500,000 |
| Total | 5,880,000 |

[2] Full Program requirement including all donors for proposed initial allocation of 45,000 tons.

BUDGET NOTES

Operational Costs.—

The operational budget is based on actual costs during 1986 and 1987 plus an eight per cent increase for inflation and contingencies. It includes the following items.

A. Project Coordinator and 2 expatriate field monitors.

B. Dire Dawa office and monitoring staff (2 accountants, 2 secretaries, 1 transport officer, 1 logistics officer, 2 commodity clerks, 7 light vehicle drivers, 5 field supervisors, 2 transport assistants, messengers, guards etc.

C. Dire Dawa office costs including telephone, telex, office supplies, utilities, etc.

D. Per diem and travel costs for staff under B and E.

E. A portion of the Addis Ababa office costs including the commodity control section, procurement, finance, and governmental liaison. Present staff in Addis Ababa total 12 nationals and 2 internationals.

F. Field distribution staff including storekeepers, distributors, and nutrition field workers. These total 181 and account for more than 50% of operational costs.

2. Transport Costs.—

A. Transport from Djibouti to Dire Dawa. This is based on actual costs during the past 2 years and includes, port fees, temporary storage, freight (rail) charges, handling, and supervision.

B. Transport from Asseb to Distribution Points. This is based on expected mileage in transporting commodities from Asseb to distribution points in the Asbetafari region. It includes salaries, benefits, and per diems of truck drivers and their assistants, fuel, maintenance, spare parts, mechanics, handling, and storage prior to distribution.

C. Transport from Dire Dawa to Distribution Points. This is based on actual costs during the past two years and includes a contingency for inflation and increased maintenance costs due to increased age of the trucking fleet. It includes salaries, benefits, and per diems of truck drivers and their assistants, fuel, maintenance, spare parts, mechanics, handling, and storage prior to distribution.

RESOURCES

CARE has approached its traditional donors to support the emergency response outlined above and is proceeding on the basis of the following plan:

| 1. *Operational Funds:* | *Amount* |
|---|---|
| ODA through CARE Britain (committed) | $112,500 |
| CARE generated funds | 50,000 |
| USAID (requested) | 617,500 |

| | |
|---|---|
| 2. *Transport Costs:* | |
| ODA through CARE Britain (committed) | 200,000 |
| CIDA through CARE Canada (committed) | 240,000 |
| USAID (requested) | 2,935,000 |
| CARE-Ethiopia spare parts stock | 350,000 |
| 3. *Truck Purchase:* | |
| Two 6×4 trucks (on request from CARE donors) | 160,000 |
| Two 4×4 4WD trucks (recent purchase through CARE Canada) | 110,000 |
| Six 4×4 4WD (requested from USAID) | 330,000 |
| 4. *Light Vehicle Purchase:* | |
| On request from CARE donors | 75,000 |
| 5. *Warehousing Contingency:* | |
| On request from CARE donors | 100,000 |
| Requested from USAID | 100,000 |
| 6. *CARE Headquarters Administrative costs:* | |
| Covered by various CARE National Headquarters | 140,000 |
| Requested from USAID | 360,000 |

Food Commodities.—

3,000 metric tons grain plus transport to Djibouti donated by CIDA through CARE Canada expected arrival Jan/Feb 1988 firm commitment.

2,500 metric tons grain plus transport to Djibouti donated by ODA through CARE Britain expected arrival Dec. 1987 grain will be purchased in September 1987.

39,500 metric tons of grain plus transport to Djibouti/Asseb on request from USAID, with first shipments to arrive as soon as possible.

1,710 metric tons of vegetable oil on request from USAID with first shipments to arrive concurrent with grain.

*Summary of Funding Sources*

| | *Amount* |
|---|---|
| Available from CARE | 540,000 |
| CARE Donor Commitments | 662,500 |
| Requested from USAID | 4,342,500 |
| Requested from CARE donors | 335,000 |
| Total | 5,880,000 |

In view of the seriousness of the situation in Hararghe and additional expected shortfalls CARE is also negotiating with donors to obtain support for needs determined later this calendar year. In 1987 donors other than USAID contributed over $1,500,000 and 17,000 tons of food commodities for CARE's program in Hararge. It is hoped that such donors, including Canada and the U.K., will continue their support and assist in meeting at least a portion of the need not covered in this proposal.


SAUDI ARABIA
SUDAN
RED SEA
ERITREA
MITSIWA
ASMERA
YEMEN
SOUTH YEMEN
GONDER
TIGRAY
MEKELE
GONDER
WELO
DJIBOUTI
GULF OF ADEN
GOJAM
DEBRE MARKOS
SHEWA
DIRE DAWA
SOMALIA
WELEGA
ADDIS ABEBA
METU
ASELA
HARERGE
ILUBABOR
MA
KEFA
AWASA
GOBA
BALE
GAMO GOFA
SIDAMO
KENYA
ETHIOPIA
Paved Roads
Tracks
Railways
Rivers
Airports
Regional Boundaries
UNHCR Emergency Unit

MAP OF HARARGHE REGION



PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN SWENSON, CATHOLIC RELIEF SERVICES

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Select Committee, on behalf of Catholic Relief Services I want to thank you for your invitation to testify. We have been privileged to work with this committee and its dedicated and talented staff since its inception, and particularly during the years of the Ethiopian famine beginning in 1984. We would like to take this opportunity to commend the committee for its leadership at that time and also for its prompt action in addressing the grim prospect of another wave of hunger and suffering that threatens in Ethiopia today.

About two weeks ago, the Washington Post carried a front page story from Ethiopia with a headline saying "It is Happening Again." Few of us would have to ask what the "it" referred to is. During the course of 1984 and 1985 the awareness that from eight to ten million people were in jeopardy of starvation in Ethiopia elicited an unprecedented worldwide response which made that country an indelible emblem of suffering humanity. A million people may have died in those years, but millions more were saved thanks to the international relief effort in which the United States played a central role. Now, just short of three years later, Ethiopia stands on the brink of famine once again.

The overwhelming disaster that threatened in 1984 and 1985 was largely averted and conditions in many parts of the country, though tenuous, began to show some improvement. The large concentrations of people in camps such as those at Korem and Bati which so touched public compassion were closed by the end of 1985 as people returned to their homes. The large scale relief effort was reduced in light of the new conditions. Many of the 45 private agencies at work in the country at the height of the famine were able to suspend feeding operations altogether. Others, like CRS, concentrated on emergency measures in remaining pockets of famine and supported programs aimed at recovery and rehabilitation. Even so, in the course of 1986 CRS and its partner agencies in the Joint Relief Partnership (JRP) distributed some 150,000 metric tons of food.

Our plans for 1987 had been to continue to reduce the size of our relief programs in expectation of further improvement. We were prepared to continue our "regular" feeding programs of mother and child nutrition, to respond as needed to severe localized conditions and to proceed with an extensive series of development projects looking toward recovery. Early in the year, however, danger signs began to appear. The combination of shortfall in the rains followed by near-flood conditions when badly eroded soils were unable to absorb the rains that did fall has been documented by the Famine Early Warning System Country Report on Ethiopia prepared for AID and published in September of this year. The Ethiopian Relief and Rehabilitation Commission (RRC), which has been closely monitoring the situation, estimated last month that the emergency food deficit for 1988, based on failures in the harvests this year due to climatic conditions, will amount to at least 950,000 metric tons. An FAO report expected in November may show an even higher figure.

Until the FAO report is completed and made available, it is difficult to exactly quantify the magnitude of the need or to project its extent. We have been in close touch with our field staff in Ethiopia and have been following the situation carefully. From their reports, it is clear that food is needed now in nearly all regions of the country and particularly in Eritrea, Tigray and Harrarge as well as large parts of Wollo and Gonder. We believe that the most critical period will begin in November and are making every effort possible to move food to the most vulnerable areas that we can identify. Let me summarize the reporting we have received in the past few days for these regions of the country to give the committee some appreciation of conditions as they are being seen on the ground.

HARRARGE

In the southern province of Harrarge, the rainfall for 1987 was similar to that during the drought years. The principal crops of the region are sorghum and maize. This year the government distributed large quantities of maize seeds to farmers there in the hope of adequate rains. In the drought conditions which actually prevailed, it is estimated that over 80 percent of the maize crop has been lost. Drought resistant sorghum strains have survived at a better rate and estimates we have received indicate that sorghum yields may be 50 to 75 percent of normal. Even so, we have had reports that 65 percent of the total crop cultivation in Harrarge was maize which means that there will be a severe shortfall in the harvest.

Drought conditions are already affecting the price of food commodities in Harrarge. The prices of basic grains have increased by 100 to 150 percent over the past six months. At the same time, the price of livestock is falling as nomadic people sell their animals to acquire grain to supplement their diets. In the face of these condi-

tions, the government is requesting immediate assistance for some 250,000 people. We believe that this figure may increase to 1.2 million or more in the coming months.

CRS and its partners are currently operating a program in Harrarge assisting 42,000 recipients. Though we monitor nutritional levels in this effort, such information for the region as a whole is sketchy and inconclusive. Based on past experience, it is unlikely that nutritional statistics will indicate the full seriousness of the emergency until it is too late. Thus we are now reviewing the possibility of borrowing food from the government or other sources so that we can begin opening emergency centers in November and December.

ERITREA

In some parts of Eritrea conditions have not really improved in any significant degree from the drought years, while the armed conflict that has persisted for more than twenty years in the region has continued unabated. Recent reports indicate that the overall situation in Eritrea has worsened over the last months. Preliminary reports on the harvest there are that, except in a few areas, nearly all the crops will be lost. In some areas which showed promise, army worms have completed the destruction of the crops begun by the weather. Our partner in Eritrea, the Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat (ECS), believes as many as 1.5 million people in the region may be in need of assistance in the months ahead.

Food prices in Eritrea for all basic grains have already increased by 100 percent or more. The nutritional data which we have compiled from our ongoing distribution programs charts a steady increase in the number of children below 80 percent of weight for height. In October of 1986 the percentage of the 32,000 children in our programs listed as malnourished at entry was 10.40 percent and by June of this year the figure stood at 24.41 percent. These figures are indicative rather than conclusive, but they tend to confirm that Eritrea is one of the most hard hit regions of the country. Working through the ECS, CRS and the JRP are currently distributing food to 183,750 recipients and we are gearing up to substantially expand the program in the coming months.

TIGRAY

In Tigray, drought conditions are similar to those of 1984 and 1985; and armed conflict continues in some parts of the region. The principal crops of the area are teff, maize, sorghum, wheat and barley. Except for some areas of western Tigray, it is estimated that crop failures were extensive. For the province as a whole reports indicate that as much as 75 percent of the crops have been lost. As a result, we believe that there may be as many as 1.2 million people at risk.

The other indicators are also present. Prices of basic grains in Tigray have increased by from 70 to 80 percent, through food assistance has had a stablilizing effect on prices in some areas. The price of livestock has fallen in a manner similar to that in Harrarge. Though we have not yet seen significant migration of the kind that occurred in 1984 and 1985, we believe that famine conditions in Tigray could reach the same proportions as in those years. The JRP, and ICRC and the RRC are currently feeding from 300,000 to 350,000 people each in Tigray and we are exploring ways to expand our operations to meet the growing need.

GONDER

It appears that eastern Gonder has been severely affected by drought, through information is sketchy due to the inaccessability of the area. One report we have seen indicates that several hundred thousand people in that part of Gonder may have no harvest at all and, to make matters worse, are almost totally without water. In such circumstances, it seems likely that people will be forced to migrate to places like Ibnat which were sites of camps three years ago. We are still seeking more information on conditions in Gonder and hope to have a clearer picture in a week or ten days.

WOLLO

Information about conditions in Wollo is also limited at this time. Early reports indicate that the level of need there will not reach the levels of 1984 and 1985, but that relief operations will be necessary in some areas. Based on current information, we estimate that people in the highland regions may expect to harvest from 30 to 50 percent of their crops. Since the region had one good food crop in 1986, however,

there may be some food reserves available. Nonetheless, the government expects some 1.3 million people to require some form of food assistance during 1988.

Though such reports are not complete, they do indicate the seriousness of the situation as it stands in Ethiopia. As I have indicated, we expect that the FAO report will only confirm that the country is on the threshold of another major emergency. It should be noted, however, that there are important differences between what we are seeing today and what occurred three years ago. First, there is a food distribution network and infrastructure in place, involving the participation of the Ethiopian Government and private networks like the JRP. Second, there was a generally adequate harvest last year. Third, there is more time available for an appropriate response if all involved act with the speed that is required.

There is no time to be lost. We believe that the effects of the recent crop failures and the exhaustion of what existing reserves there are will become fully evident in November. Thus, if conditions like those that prevailed three years ago are to be avoided, particularly the large concentrations of people in overcrowded and unsanitary camps far from their homes, action is necessary now.

Food and funds in large quantities need to begin flowing now in order to establish the pipeline of regular supplies from port to port and inland to distribution centers that will be needed to feed the large and growing number of those who will face famine conditions in the next six months and more. Food will be required not only for immediate distribution, but also for prepositioning at strategic sites around the country to help relieve pressure on the ports and to ensure that there are reserves available in the event of delays in delivery or breakdowns in in-country transportation. Existing truck fleets have been hard pressed in the past few years given the rugged terrain over which they must travel. Maintenance and a steady supply of spare parts will be important elements in assuring that food supplies move swiftly and efficiently to distribution centers.

In the famine years of 1984 and 1985, CRS joined together in with the Lutheran World Federation, the Ethiopian Evangelical Church Makene Yesus and the Ethiopian Catholic Secretariat in an ecumenical consortium called the Joint Relief Partnership. This effort, working through local groups and private voluntary organizations eventually reached out into 12 of the 14 provinces of Ethiopia feeding nearly 2 million people. About half of the U.S. food assistance provided to Ethiopia during the famine moved through the JRP.

That partnership is still in place and action is underway to extend the current levels of distribution to reach out to as many as 1.2 million recipients or more beginning now and extending into 1988. We have approval for 10,000 metric tons of food and inland transport costs from the U.S. Government for the balance of the year over previous levels and expect approval of another 10,000 tons for the same period. The USG has also approved our request for over 58,000 tons of food and $7 million in inland transport costs for the period January–April of 1988, with the prospect of additional food for the balance of the year if that is needed. Our partners in the JRP have secured food and inland transport from the EEC and will be seeking other support from European sources in the next few weeks.

To date, the response of donors, particularly of the U.S. Government, has been prompt and timely. The Ethiopian Government has provided full information on the situation (including public acknowledgment and thanks for the contributions made by the U.S. Government) and has been consistently cooperative with private groups working in the country. If we can keep the momentum going and build on the cooperation among governments, international organizations and private agencies that together formed the basis of the response three years ago, then there is more than a fair chance that the worst can be avoided. The task now is to save lives and to prevent the immense disruption and suffering that mass migrations caused by hunger bring about. The real danger at this point is delay.

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